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INTRODUCTION
Federal and state laws allow U.S. financial conglomerates to own
securities, insurance and depository institutions through a holding
company structure. Before the recent crisis, the federal or state
agency responsible for regulating a financial conglomerate as a whole
was determined by what subsidiaries the holding company owned,
1
and in particular, the type of depository institution was usually
determinative as to which agency regulated the financial
2
conglomerate on a consolidated basis. For example, the Office of
Thrift Supervision supervised American International Group, Inc.
(AIG), instead of the Federal Reserve, because AIG owned a thrift,
3
not a bank.
The multiple regulators for financial conglomerates led to a
number of problems that contributed to the recent financial crisis.
Among the problems created were inconsistent supervisory and
regulatory standards, particularly with regard to capital adequacy, a
failure by regulators to undertake the risks (systemic, financial,
operational, etc.) posed by subsidiaries in sectors outside of the
primary responsibility of the regulator, regulatory arbitrage, and a
1. Depository institutions include commercial banks, thrifts, credit unions and
industrial banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A) (2006). All of these entities accept
deposits and make loans. See id. § 1841(c). The differences between these entities
are based on their ownership structures, the range of services that they provide, and
the regulatory requirements that they must meet. See id. § 1841.
2. See discussion infra Part I.A–F.
3. See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
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failure to address the problems of increasingly interconnected and
larger financial conglomerates that posed systemic risks that made
4
regulators opposed to letting them fail.
This last problem is
generally referred to as the “too big to fail” problem.
5
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(the “Dodd-Frank Act” or “Act”) attempts to correct some of these
problems.
This Article discusses how the different financial
conglomerate regulations contributed to the recent financial crisis
and whether the reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act corrected these
problems. Part I will outline the prior regulatory structure. Part II
will address the problems created by this structure that contributed to
the recent financial crisis. Part III will describe the reforms
contained in the Dodd-Frank Act and analyze to what extent they
correct the problems present in the prior regulatory regime. Finally,
the Conclusion will point out what additional reforms might be taken
to build on the reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act.
I.

PRE-CRISIS REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR FINANCIAL
CONGLOMERATES

The United States has over 115 federal and state agencies
6
regulating some aspect of financial services within the United States.
These regulators include the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Federal Reserve), the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) in the Treasury Department, the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) in the Treasury Department, the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty

4. See discussion infra Part II.A–F.
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301) [hereinafter
Dodd-Frank Act].
6. The number of state agencies regulating banking, securities, and insurance
equals 110 because some states have incorporated the regulation of banks and
securities firms or banks and insurance companies or firms from all three sectors
into one agency. See Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the
United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 n.7
(2005). The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) replaced the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and was created by the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 110 Pub. L. No. 289, 122 Stat. 2654 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 4501). See also 12 U.S.C. § 4511 (section of U.S.C. amended by § 1101
of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act).
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Corporation (PBGC), as well as state insurance, banking, and
securities regulatory agencies in all fifty states plus the District of
7
Columbia.
Immediately prior to the current financial crisis, financial
conglomerates could be regulated by the Federal Reserve, the OCC,
the OTS, the SEC, the FHFA, and state regulators. Which federal
regulator supervised a financial conglomerate depended in large part
on whether the financial conglomerate owned a depository
8
institution and what type of depository institution they owned.
Depository institutions include commercial banks, thrifts, credit
9
unions, and industrial banks. All of these entities accept deposits
10
and make loans. The differences between these entities are based
on their ownership structures, the range of services that they provide,
and the regulatory requirements that they must meet. In addition,
the type of entity that may own certain depository entities is restricted
11
by law. The federal Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA)
mandates that the holding companies for “banks,” as defined within
the BHCA, must only be involved in activities that are related to
12
banking or financial services. With certain exceptions, the BHCA
defines a “bank” as an insured bank as defined under section 3(h) of
13
the Federal Deposition Insurance Act or an institution which
14
accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans. Among the
entities exempted from the definition of a “bank” under the BHCA
are thrifts, credit unions, industrial loan companies, limited purpose
banks that engage solely in trust or fiduciary activities, entities that
engage solely in credit card operations, and foreign bank
15
subsidiaries. As a result, the holding company for an industrial bank
is not limited to engaging only in activities related to banking or
financial services because an industrial bank is not considered a

7. See Brown, supra note 6, at 5–6 (describing the “balkanized regulatory
structure” of the U.S. financial services); see also 12 U.S.C. § 4511 (creating the
FHFA).
8. See infra notes 9–15, 32–38, 60, 65–69, 76–86 and accompanying text.
9. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c).
11. Id. §§ 1841–49.
12. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y),
12 C.F.R. § 225.21 (2010).
13. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–35.
14. Id. § 1841(c). Section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines an
“insured bank” as “any bank (including a foreign bank having an insured branch)
the deposits of which are insured in accordance with the provisions of this chapter;
and the term ‘noninsured bank’ means any bank the deposits of which are not so
insured.” Id. § 1813(h).
15. Id. § 1841(a)(5).
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“bank” under the BHCA. The state laws governing industrial bank
16
holding companies also do not put any such limitations on them. As
a result, commercial and retail businesses, like Target, can own
17
industrial banks.
Before discussing in more depth how the federal and state holding
company regulators operated, it is worth noting that some financial
conglomerates were not regulated by either a federal or state holding
company regulator. If a conglomerate did not own a bank, a thrift,
or an industrial loan company, but owned other financial companies,
such as commercial finance companies or investment companies,
federal and state holding company regulators might lack any
18
authority to regulate the conglomerate as a whole. The individual
subsidiaries within such a conglomerate would be regulated by their
19
respective functional or institutional regulators, to the extent that
they existed, but no regulator would have been examining how those
16. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 carved out an exemption from
the definition of “bank” in the Bank Holding Company Act for industrial loan
companies and industrial banks. See id. § 1841(c)(2)(H); Bank Holding Companies
and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y), 12 C.F.R. § 225.21 (2010). For an
example of state laws governing industrial bank holding companies, see CAL. FIN.
CODE §§ 18438–54 (West 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-16 (LexisNexis 2006).
17. Target owns Target Bank, a Utah state chartered industrial bank. See Business
Credit Card Services Help, TARGET, http://www.target.com/Business-Card-CreditServices-Help/b?ie=UTF8&node=14052341 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). Nevertheless,
prior to the crisis in 2007, the ten largest industrial banks by assets were owned by
firms involved in financial services. See INS. INFO. INST., THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT
BOOK 2009, at 68 (2009). The top ten industrial banks by assets and their parents (as
noted by parentheses) as of March 31, 2008 were as follows: 1. Merrill Lynch Bank
USA (Merrill Lynch), 2. Morgan Stanley Bank (Morgan Stanley), 3. GMAC Bank
(Cerberus/GMAC), 4. UBS Bank USA (UBS), 5. Goldman Sachs Bank (Goldman
Sachs), 6. American Express Centurion Bank (American Express), 7. Capmark Bank
(Capmark Financial Group/GMAC), 8. Lehman Brothers Commercial Bank
(Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), 9. Fremont Investment & Loan (Fremont
General Corporation/Diamond A. Ford), and 10. USAA Savings Bank (USAA Life
Company). Id. The top eight of these ten industrial banks were chartered in Utah.
See id.
18. See discussion infra Part I.A–F (concerning the regulation of holding
companies for banks, thrifts, and industrial loan companies). Entities falling outside
of those regulations are not regulated on a consolidated basis as a holding company.
19. Under functional regulation, a regulator focuses on regulating a particular
category of financial products or services being provided, rather than the institution
providing those products or services. PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL
§ 12.02[2] (2d ed. 2003). Under functional regulation, the SEC would regulate the
securities regardless of whether they were offered to investors by banks or securities
firms. See id. Historically, under institutional regulation, federal and state bank
regulators regulated securities offered by banks. Id. Historically, federal and state
legislators created regulators to regulate particular financial institutions. Id. This
type of regulation is called institutional or entity regulation. Id. The Gramm-LeachBliley Act was designed to move the U.S. regulatory system away from institutional
regulation towards functional regulation. See id. The U.S. regulatory system prior to
the financial crisis, however, was not a pure functional regulatory scheme but rather
a mixture of institutional and functional regulation. See Brown, supra note 6, at 19.
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subsidiaries interacted with the other subsidiaries owned by the
conglomerate or the interconnectedness of all of a particular
conglomerate’s operations with the rest of the financial system.
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is an example of a large financial
conglomerate (over 80% of its total revenues in 2009 came from
20
financial services) that has no federal holding company regulator.
Its insurance subsidiaries, however, are regulated by state insurance
21
commissions for the states in which they operate.
If all financial conglomerates that lacked a holding company
regulator operated like Berkshire Hathaway, perhaps such regulators
would not be needed. Enron Corp., however, illustrates why the
absence of a financial services holding company regulator might
matter. No federal or state financial services holding company
regulator oversaw Enron’s business despite the fact that it was a
22
financial conglomerate.
One of Enron’s core businesses was
23
According to its 2000 financial statements,
derivatives trading.
about 7% of Enron’s total revenues and one-third of its assets came
24
from its derivative business. In addition, in its 2000 annual report to
the SEC, Enron reported that it owned a controlling interest in
dozens of finance and investment companies in the United States and
25
across the globe. Its consolidated financial statements included the
revenues, assets and liabilities of these subsidiaries. Enron, however,
had more than 3000 off-balance sheet subsidiaries and partnerships,
26
many of whom engaged in derivatives deals with Enron. According
to one study, Enron’s derivatives book had a notional value of $758

20. Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 28 (Feb. 26, 2010).
21. See id. at 1–3.
22. See Enron Corp., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), Ex. 21 (April 2, 2001)
[hereinafter Enron 2000 10-K Report] (listing Enron’s subsidiaries). Enron did not
own a bank, a thrift, or an industrial loan company. As a result, it did not have a
federal or state financial services holding company regulator. See discussion infra
Part I.A–F (highlighting pre-crisis regulating structures). In addition, Enron’s
annual report discussed being regulated as a public utility holding company and
other types of federal regulation, but did not discuss being regulated as a financial
services holding company. See Enron 2000 10-K Report, supra, at 15–21.
23. See Enron and the Use of Derivatives: Testimony before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Partnoy Hearing] (statement
of Prof. Frank Partnoy) (highlighting Enron’s trading derivatives in the year 2000,
which made more money alone than Long-Term Capital Management made in its
entire history), available at http://reg-markets.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirectsafely.php?fname=../pdffiles/testimony_02_03.pdf; ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS:
GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 6 (2002).
24. BRYCE, supra note 23, at 241; Enron 2000 10-K Report, supra note 22, at F-3,
F-4.
25. Enron 2000 10-K Report, supra note 22, at Ex. 21.
26. See Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 3.
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billion at the end of 2000. To put this in perspective, Enron’s book
represented slightly less than 1% of the approximately $109.2 trillion
derivatives market at the end of 2000, but this book was about threefourths of the notional value of the derivatives positions of Long
Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund, when the Federal
28
Reserve arranged for fourteen banks to bail out LTCM in 1998.
Not only did Enron escape regulation on a consolidated basis as a
holding company for various financial services, but many of its
subsidiaries were not subjected to either functional or institutional
regulation. Neither the SEC, the CFTC, nor any other federal or
state agency regulated the over-the-counter derivatives trading
29
conducted by Enron and its subsidiaries. The Commodities Futures
30
Modernization Act of 2000 exempted such derivatives from
31
Consequently, functional or institutional regulation
regulation.
sometimes failed to provide adequate protection for the financial
system from financial conglomerates that lacked a holding company
regulator.
A. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
The OCC regulates national banks that owned subsidiaries that sell
32
insurance or securities. These financial subsidiaries can only engage
in financial activities that the bank could engage in directly. Thus,
these subsidiaries cannot engage in annuities or insurance
27. BRYCE, supra note 23, at 242 (citing a study by Randall Dodd and Jason Hoody
of the Derivatives Study Center).
28. See Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 2 (providing a figure for the derivatives
market that includes both the $14 trillion in exchange traded derivatives and the
$95.2 trillion in over-the-counter derivatives); see also BRYCE, supra note 23, at 324–25
(describing the LTCM’s $1 trillion derivatives position and its bailout); KEVIN DOWD,
CATO INST., TOO BIG TO FAIL? LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE FEDERAL
RESERVE 1–5 (1999) (describing LTCM’s bailout).
29. See Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 2–3.
30. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
31. See Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 3.
32. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 23, 26, 27, 93a (2006) (outlining the OCC’s authority to
charter and regulate national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2), (g)(5)–(6) (discussing
types of subsidiaries that a national bank may operate). “Well-capitalized” for these
purposes is defined as having the same meaning as in section 38 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act. Id. § 1831o(b)(1)(A). For a bank that has been examined,
“well-managed” means that the bank has received a composite rating of one or two
under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System and at least a rating of two
for management. Id. § 24a(g)(6). For banks that have not been examined, “wellmanaged” means that the bank’s managerial resources are deemed satisfactory by the
appropriate Federal banking agency. Id. The OCC will send a notice to any national
bank failing to meet these requirements that orders it to correct the deficiencies. Id.
§ 24a(e)(1). If the bank fails to correct these deficiencies within 180 days after
receiving the notice, then the OCC may order the bank to divest control of any
financial subsidiary. Id. § 24a(e)(4).
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underwriting, insurance company portfolio investments, real estate
33
investment or development, or merchant banking. In addition, the
national bank cannot allow the aggregate consolidated total assets of
all of its financial subsidiaries to exceed the lesser of $50 billion or
34
45% of the national bank’s consolidated total assets.
B. Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve regulates two types of financial
conglomerates—bank holding companies (“BHC”) and financial
35
holding companies (“FHC”). The BHCA mandates that the holding
companies for “banks,” as defined within the Act, must only be
36
involved in activities that are related to banking or financial services.
With certain exceptions, the BHCA defines a “bank” as an insured
bank as defined under section 3(h) of the Federal Deposition
37
Insurance Act or an institution which accepts demand deposits and
38
makes commercial loans.
The BHCA allows BHCs to own
subsidiaries that engage in nonbank activities only if those activities
39
are closely related to banking activities. These nonbank activities
include, among others, to act as insurance agents or brokers
primarily in connection with credit extensions, to underwrite credit
life, accident, and health insurance, to act as a futures commission
40
merchant, and to act as a discount brokerage.
41
In 2008 as the crisis was breaking, large BHCs only comprised a
little over 9% of the total number of BHCs, but they held 93.3% of
42
the total assets held by all BHCs. In 2009, the large BHCs continued
to grow even as the number of small BHCs declined. The number of

33. Id. § 24a(a)(2)(B).
34. Id. § 24a(a)(2)(D).
35. Id. § 1841(a)(1), (p).
36. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y),
12 C.F.R. § 225.21(a) (2010).
37. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–35.
38. Id. § 1841(c). Section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines an
“insured bank” as “any bank (including a foreign bank having an insured branch)
the deposits of which are insured in accordance with the provisions of this chapter”;
and the term “noninsured bank” as “any bank the deposits of which are not so
insured.” Id. § 1813(h).
39. Id. §§ 1841(c)(2), 1843(c)(8), (13); ALAN GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION,
REREGULATION: THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING, INSURANCE, AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES
66–67 (1994).
40. GART, supra note 39, at 66.
41. The Federal Reserve defines large BHCs as those with more than $1 billion in
total assets. U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 95TH ANNUAL REPORT
98 (2008) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 2008], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/annual08/pdf/AR08.pdf.
42. Id.
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large BHCs
B
had in
ncreased by three
t
while the
t number of small BH
HCs
had de
eclined by fifty-nine,
f
an
nd the largee BHCs’ shaare of the to
otal
43
assets held
h
by all BH
HCs increaseed to 93.9%..
Figuree 1: Number of
o Bank Holdiing Companiees

44

43. U.S.
U BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
T
FED. RESERV
RVE SYS., 96TH ANNUAL REPORT 102
(2009) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESSERVE ANNUALL REPORT 2009], available at
http://w
www.federalreseerve.gov/board
ddocs/rptcongrress/annual09/
/default.htm.
44. U.S.
U BD. OF GOVERNORS
O
OF TH
HE FED. RESERV
VE SYS., 94TH ANNUAL REPORT
T 86
(2003) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESSERVE ANNUALL REPORT 2003], available at
http://w
www.federalreseerve.gov/board
ddocs/rptcongrress/annual03/
/ar03.pdf; FEDEERAL
RESERVE ANNUAL REPOR
RT 2008, supra note
n
41, at 98; FEDERAL RESERVVE ANNUAL REPPORT
2009, suppra note 43, at 102.
1
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6; FEDERAL RESEERVE
ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 41, at 98; FEDERA
AL RESERVE ANN
NUAL REPORT 20
009,
supra note 43, at 102.
46. Pub.
P
L. No. 106
6-102, § 1, 107 Stat. 1338 (199
99) (codified at
a 12 U.S.C. § 1831
1
(2006)).
47. 12
1 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2006).
48. 12
1 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 (1935) (rrepealed 1999)..
49. Community
C
Reiinvestment Actt of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–08.
50. See
S generally 12 U.S.C. § 1843
3 (describing alternative
a
activvities allowed and
exceptio
ons thereto).
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determ
mines to be financial in
i nature, incidental to
t finance, or
comple
ementary to a financial activity,
a
provvided that such activity does
51
not pose a substan
ntial risk to the
t safety an
nd soundnesss of the FHC
C.
52
A FHC generally may
m not engage in nonfin
nancial activiities.
Figure 3: Number of Financial
F
Hollding Compan
nies

53

Cs that existeed before thee enactmentt of
Onlyy a minority of the BHC
GLBA chose to beccome FHCs. The total number
n
of FHCs
F
peaked
d at
54
644 in 2003 as sho
own in Figure 3 above. This numb
ber represented
55
l
over 10
0% of the BH
HCs in existeence in 1999
9. In addition,
only a little
very few non-BHC financial co
onglomeratees chose to become FH
HCs.
For exaample, in 2003 when thee number of FHCs was att its peak, FH
HCs

51. Id.
I
52. See
S 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n) (desscribing the ex
xtent to which BHCs may reetain
nonfinan
ncial affiliation
ns). The GLBA
A only permitteed FHCs that were
w
not BHCs or
foreign banks
b
before becoming
b
FHC
Cs after Nov. 12
2, 1999 to conttinue to engage in
any nonffinancial activitties that they were
w
lawfully en
ngaged in on Seeptember 30, 1999
1
under ce
ertain circumsttances and for a limited perio
od. Id. Such FHCs
F
were to ceease
such no
onfinancial acttivities by Novvember 12, 20
009, unless graanted a five year
y
extension by the Federal Reserve Boarrd. Id.
53. FEDERAL RESERVVE ANNUAL REPO
ORT 2003, supra
a note 44, at 86
6; FEDERAL RESEERVE
ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 41, at 98; FEDERA
AL RESERVE ANN
NUAL REPORT 20
009,
supra note 43, at 102.
54. Compare
C
FEDERA
AL RESERVE ANNUAL
N
REPORT 2003, supra no
ote 44, at 86 (644
(
FHCs in 2003), with FEDERAL
E
RESERVEE ANNUAL REPOR
RT 2008, supra note 41 at 98, and
FEDERAL RESERVE ANNU
UAL REPORT 200
09, supra note 43, at 102 (illu
ustrating a grad
dual
decrease
e in the number of FHCs from
m 2003 to 2009)).
55. See
S FEDERAL RESERVE
E
ANNUALL REPORT 2003, supra note 44,
4 at 86; FEDEERAL
RESERVE ANNUAL REPOR
RT 2008, supra note
n
41, at 98; FEDERAL RESERVVE ANNUAL REPPORT
2009, suppra note 43, at 102.
1
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that had not been registered as BHCs prior to the GLBA represented
56
only 22% of the registered FHCs. These financial conglomerates
57
included Charles Schwab & Co., MetLife and Franklin Resources.
The GLBA did not require financial conglomerates to register as
BHCs or FHCs if they did not own banks subject to the Bank Holding
Company Act.
As a result, many of the largest financial
conglomerates chose not to register as FHCs, including American
58
Express, AIG, Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch. In
many cases, these firms did own other types of depository institutions.
For example, AIG owned AIG Federal Savings Bank, a thrift,
Goldman Sachs owned Goldman Sachs Bank USA, an industrial loan
company, and Morgan Stanley owned Morgan Bank, an industrial
loan company, Morgan Stanley Trust, a federal savings association,
Morgan Stanley Trust National Association, a limited purpose
59
national bank, and certain foreign bank subsidiaries.
C. Office of Thrift Supervision
Financial conglomerates that own thrifts, like AIG, are classified as
60
thrift holding companies (“THCs”) and are regulated by the OTS.
At the end of 2007, the OTS was supervising 475 thrift holding
61
companies. Those thrift holding companies own about 35% of all
of the thrifts in the United States and more than half of the thrifts
62
regulated by the OTS in 2007. Those thrift holding companies held
56. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES UNDER THE GRAMMLEACH-BLILEY ACT 2–3 (2003) (noting that FHCs “represent 78 percent of the total
assets of all bank holding companies” in 2003).
57. Id.
58. Brown, supra note 6, at 13 n.42.
59. See About AIG Bank, AIGBANK,
https://www.aigbank.com/aigbank/aboutaig.jsp (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); Press
Release, U.S. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Order Approving the
Formation of Bank Holding Companies—Goldman Sachs, Inc. (Sept. 22, 2008),
available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a1.pdf;
Press Release, U.S. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Order Approving the
Formation of Bank Holding Companies and Notice to Engage in Certain
Nonbanking Activities—Morgan Stanley (Sept. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a2.pdf.
60. See Home Owners’ Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1467a (2006) (setting forth
specific regulations concerning financial conglomerates); OFFICE OF THRIFT
SUPERVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2008 FACT BOOK 77 n.17 (2009)
[hereinafter OTS FACT BOOK].
61. OTS FACT BOOK, supra note 60, at 71. Some savings associations are owned by
more than one holding company, which is why there are more holding companies
than savings associations that own them.
62. Id. at 5–6, 71. THCs owned 435 thrifts out of the 1252 thrifts in the United
States, of which the OTS regulated only 827 in 2007. Id.
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US $8.4 trillion in assets, of which only about 15% were thrift assets
63
The OTS
and the remainder came from other enterprises.
supervised some very large conglomerates as THCs, including AIG,
Countrywide Financial, General Electric Company, General Motors
Corporation, IndyMac Bancorp Inc., Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley,
64
and Washington Mutual.
D. Securities and Exchange Commission
Section 231 of the GLBA amended section 78q of the Securities
Exchange Act to give the SEC authority to act as a holding company
regulator for financial conglomerates that were not regulated as bank
65
or thrift holding companies by the Federal Reserve or the OTS.
Under section section 78q(i), however, the SEC could only regulate
those holding companies that voluntarily elected to be subject to its
66
regulation. The SEC did not set up any procedures for regulating
67
financial conglomerates under this provision until 2004. Under the
regime created by the SEC, a financial conglomerate could elect to
be supervised by the SEC as either consolidated supervised entity
(“CSE”) or as supervised investment bank holding company
68
(“SIBHC”). The SEC’s Division of Market Regulation acted as the
69
prudential supervisor for both CSEs and SIBHCs.
Seven firms voluntarily became CSEs—the Bear Stearns
Companies, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan
Chase & Co., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Merrill Lynch Bank &
70
Trust Co., and Morgan Stanley. The SEC was the sole consolidated
63. Id. at 71.
64. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION: AGENCIES
ENGAGED IN CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION CAN STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENT AND COLLABORATION 12 (2007) [hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL MARKET
REGULATION REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07154.pdf;
Countrywide Financial Corporation, Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 17 (Feb. 28,
2007); IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 10 (Mar. 1, 2007);
Washington Mutual Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 7 (Mar. 1, 2007).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i) (2006).
66. Id.
67. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200) [hereinafter CSE Final Rule]; Supervised Investment Bank
Holding Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,472 (Aug. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 200) [hereinafter SIBHC Final Rule].
68. See CSE Final Rule, supra note 67, at 34,428; SIBHC Final Rule, supra note 67,
at 34,474–76 (setting forth Rule 17i-2).
69. See Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3 (2010).
70. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF
AUDITS, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED
SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM iv (Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter SEC IG’S CSE REPORT],
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf.
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supervisor for only four of these firms. The Federal Reserve
supervised Citigroup Inc. and JP Morgan Chase & Co., which were
registered FHCs, and the OTS supervised parts of Lehman Brothers,
71
Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley, as THCs.
The SEC finally created the CSE and SIBHC regime in 2004
because it had been subject to intense lobbying from U.S. financial
conglomerates that did not have a primary federal regulator and were
concerned about being subject to regulation by European financial
supervisors under the European Union’s Financial Conglomerates
72
Directive (“EU FCD”).
The EU FCD was adopted in 2002 and
required supervisors and financial groups to measure on a
consolidated basis the prudential soundness of groups with
significant business in the banking, securities and insurance sectors
73
and that are operating within the European Union. The EU FCD
also required non-EU financial conglomerates operating within the
European Union to have their home country supervisors provide a
form of consolidated supervision that is equivalent to that provided
by the EU FCD or be supervised on a consolidated basis by a financial
74
supervisor within one of the EU member nations. The directive
required member states to adopt the laws necessary to implement the
75
directive by August 11, 2004.
E. State Holding Company Regulators
In addition to these federal regulators for holding companies, the
state banking and financial institution regulators also regulate
holding companies. As a result, holding companies can be subject to
duplicative state and federal regulation.
For example, Capital One Financial Corporation owns Capital One
Bank, which was a Virginia state chartered bank until March 2008
76
when it converted to a national bank charter. As a result, Capital
One Financial Corporation is a BHC regulated by the Federal
77
Reserve.
In 2005, Capital One Financial Corporation elected to
become a FHC regulated by the Federal Reserve so that it could offer
78
a wider range of financial products. Because Capital One Bank was
71. Id. at v.
72. Council Directive 2002/87, 2002 O.J. (L 35) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Financial
Conglomerates Directive]; SEC IG’S CSE REPORT, supra note 70, at 4.
73. See Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 72, at arts. 5–9.
74. Id. art. 18, at 12.
75. Id. art. 34, at 23.
76. Capital One Fin. Corp., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 45 (Feb. 26, 2010).
77. Id. at 8.
78. Id. at 8–9.
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originally a Virginia state chartered bank, Capital One Financial
Corporation is registered as a financial institution holding company
under Virginia law and subject to regulation by the Virginia Bureau
79
of Financial Institutions.
Holding companies that own industrial loan companies or
industrial banks, but do not own a bank subject to the Bank Holding
Company Act, a thrift, or a broker-dealer firm do not have a federal
80
supervisor. The state agencies that chartered an industrial bank or
an industrial loan company also supervise the industrial bank holding
81
company or industrial loan holding company that owns them.
Unlike BHCs, holding companies of industrial banks may be
commercial enterprises and may own subsidiaries that are
commercial businesses. Industrial bank holding companies are not
restricted to only engaging in financial activities.
F.

Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight

The government sponsored entities (“GSEs”) comprise a special
category of financial conglomerate because they were originally
chartered by the federal government to help increase stability and
82
liquidity in the U.S. housing markets.
The Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal National

79. Id. at 9, 12; see VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-702 (2010).
80. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2006); Home Owners’
Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1467(a); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1g (2010).
81. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-56 (LexisNexis 2010); CAL. FIN. CODE § 18390 (West
1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-101-401 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-16 (LexisNexis
2006).
82. For purposes of this Article, GSEs only refers to the Federal National
Mortgage Association, also known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, also known as Freddie Mac. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, Annual
Report, (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Fannie Mae 2007 10-K
Report]; Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 1, 3 (Feb.
24, 2010) [hereinafter Freddie Mac 2011 10-K Report]. Other entities that are also
classified as GSEs, but which will not be discussed in this Article include the Federal
Home Loan Banks, the Farm Credit System, and the Federal Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation, also known as Farmer Mac. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04269T, GOV’T SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: A FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING GSE
GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT 1 (2004). Some commentators classify the Government
National Mortgage Association, also known as Ginnie Mae, as a GSE, but it is not a
privately owned entity that is “sponsored” by the federal government like Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the other GSEs but is, in fact, an entity that is wholly-owned
by the federal government. GOV’T NAT’L MORTG. ASS’N, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 7
(2010), available at
http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/ann_rep/annual_report10.pdf.
SLM Corporation, also known as Sallie Mae, started out as a GSE in 1972 when its
name was the Student Loan Marketing Association. SLM Corp., Annual Report,
(Form 10-K), at 2 (Feb. 28, 2011). It was completely privatized and ceased to be
classified as a GSE in 1997. Id.
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Mortgage Association, (Fannie Mae), are the two largest of these
entities. In 2007, the GSEs were ranked as two of the twenty largest
U.S. financial conglomerates based on revenues by Fortune
83
magazine.
Prior to July 30, 2008, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) in the Department of Housing and Urban
84
Development (HUD) supervised Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. On
July 30, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Authority was created
when President George W. Bush signed the Housing and Economic
85
Recovery Act of 2008. Prior to the financial crisis, OFHEO was the
prudential regulator for the GSEs and conducted periodic
86
examinations to ensure their safety and soundness.
The SEC, HUD and the Treasury Department also regulated
certain aspects of Freddie Mac’s and Fannie Mae’s business. Fannie
Mae voluntarily registered its common stock with the SEC in March
2003 and Freddie Mac voluntarily registered its common stock with
87
the SEC in July 2008. Since those registrations, the GSEs have been
subject to the periodic reporting requirements under the Securities
88
Exchange Act of 1934.
The securities issued by the GSEs are
classified as “exempted securities” and are exempt from the
89
registration requirements under the Securities Act of 1933. HUD
must approve any new programs offered by Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae and it conducts investigations to verify that they are complying
90
with the requirements of their charters and other regulations. The
GSEs can only issue certain types of debt securities with the approval
91
of the Treasury Department.

83. INS. INFO. INST., supra note 17, at 9.
84. OFHEO, 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS 53 n.2 (2008), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2097/OFHEOReporttoCongress2008.pdf;
FHFA, 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS 101 (2009), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2335/FHFA_ReportToCongress2008508rev.pdf.
85. FHFA, supra note 84, at 101.
86. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 16–19; Freddie Mac 2011 10K Report, supra note 82, at 29.
87. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 14; SEC Filings, FREDDIE MAC,
http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/sec_filings/index.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2011).
88. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 14; Freddie Mac 2011 10-K
Report, supra note 82, at 16.
89. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 14; see also Freddie Mac 2011
10-K Report, supra note 82, at 16.
90. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 14–16; Freddie Mac 2011 10K Report, supra note 82, at 6, 30.
91. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 14; Freddie Mac 2011 10-K
Report, supra note 82, at 9, 30.
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G. Supervision of Holding Company Subsidiaries
Holding company regulators, like the Federal Reserve, generally
were required to use the reports generated by the regulators for the
92
subsidiaries. For example, under GLBA, the Federal Reserve could
only examine a “functionally regulated subsidiary” of a FHC or a BHC
if:
(i) the Board has reasonable cause to believe that such subsidiary is
engaged in activities that pose a material risk to an affiliated
depository institution;
(ii) the Board reasonably determines, after reviewing relevant
reports, that examination of the subsidiary is necessary to
adequately inform the Board of the systems described in
subparagraph (A)(ii)(II) [systems for monitoring and controlling
financial and operational risks that may threaten the safety and
soundness of any depository institution subsidiary of the holding
company]; or
(iii) based on reports and other available information, the Board
has reasonable cause to believe that a subsidiary is not in
compliance with this chapter or any other Federal law that the
Board has specific jurisdiction to enforce against such subsidiary,
including provisions relating to transactions with an affiliated
depository institution, and the Board cannot make such
determination through examination of the affiliated depository
93
institution or the bank holding company.

Even if the Federal Reserve did conduct an examination of one or
more of the subsidiaries of a FHC or a BHC, it had limited authority
to impose new regulations on the subsidiaries. Under GLBA, the
Federal Reserve was prohibited from imposing any capital
requirements on any functionally regulated subsidiary of a FHC or
94
BHC. In addition, the Federal Reserve could not prescribe other
types of regulations for functionally regulated subsidiaries of a FHC
or BHC unless:
(1) the action is necessary to prevent or redress an unsafe or
unsound practice or breach of fiduciary duty by such subsidiary
that poses a material risk to—
92. See 12 U.S.C. § 1476a(b)(4) (2006) (“The Director [of OTS] shall, to the
extent deemed feasible, use for the purposes of this subsection reports filed with or
examinations made by other Federal agencies or the appropriate State supervisory
authority.”); id. § 1844(c)(2)(E) (requiring the Federal Reserve to use reports on
registered brokers, dealers, and investment advisers prepared by the SEC and state
regulators, insurance companies prepared by state insurance regulators, and on any
other subsidiary supervised by a federal or state authority).
93. Id. § 1844(c)(2)(B).
94. Id. § 1844(c)(3).
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(A) the financial safety, soundness, or stability of an affiliated
depository institution; or
(B) the domestic or international payment system; and
(2) the Board finds that it is not reasonably possible to protect
effectively against the material risk at issue through action directed
at or against the affiliated depository institution or against
95
depository institutions generally.

As a result, the Federal Reserve and other holding company
regulators generally deferred to the functional regulator of a
particular subsidiary rather than conduct their own independent
examination. This meant that they had to rely on dozens of state and
federal regulators for information about the subsidiaries of a single
financial conglomerate. Not surprisingly, the types of reports
produced by these agencies vary greatly just as the entities that they
supervise vary greatly in terms of their size and product offerings.
II. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE PRE-CRISIS REGULATORY
STRUCTURE
The pre-crisis regulatory structure contained a number of
problems associated with financial conglomerates that ultimately
contributed to the financial crisis, particularly the high leverage of
many financial conglomerates. The most serious of these problems
were: (1) the lack of uniform standards for financial conglomerates,
particularly in the area of capital requirements, (2) the lack of
coordination amongst regulators to ensure risks (systemic, financial,
operational, etc.) associated with financial conglomerates were
handled consistently and to share information and expertise, (3) the
failure of regulators to understand the risks posed by the functional
businesses in which the financial conglomerates engaged, (4) the
ability of some financial conglomerates to engage in regulatory
arbitrage through their ability to pick their regulator, and (5) the
failure of regulators to address the growth and concentration of
financial conglomerates within the financial services industry, which
allowed some firms to become too-big-to-fail, and created the moral
hazard problem that led to the bailouts. Each of these factors will be
examined in more detail.

95. Id. § 1848a(a).
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A. Lack of Uniform Supervisory and Regulatory Standards
The lack of uniform supervisory and regulatory standards arose
across a range of issues. The most serious problem, however, was the
different standards for capital adequacy.
All of the holding company regulators in the United States focused
on the capital adequacy of the holding companies on a consolidated
basis as well as the credit risks, market risks, and operational risks that
they posed. All of them were influenced in their approach to these
risks by the release by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(“Basel Committee”) in June 2004 of new capital adequacy standards
under the title, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, which came to be known as
96
Basel II.
Basel II is based on three pillars that must be met for a bank to be
adequately capitalized. Pillar I sets forth the minimum capital
required based on the bank’s total risk weighted assets, which would
be calculated using a formula that took into account credit risk,
97
market risk, and operational risk. Pillar II defines the supervisory
activities of each national authority and allows them to mandate that
banks hold additional capital to cover risks not appropriately
98
accounted for under Pillar one. Pillar III outlines the reporting and
public disclosure requirements for banks in an effort to use
disclosure and market discipline to encourage appropriate risk
99
management by banks.
Basel II gave banks a choice of making their capital adequacy
calculations in one of three ways. They could use a simplified
100
approach that employed fixed weights set by the Basel Committee.
Alternatively, they could use a standardized approach that relied on
external ratings provided by credit agencies to adjust the weights of
101
the assets. Finally, they could use an internal ratings-based (“IRB”)
102
approach based upon their own internal risk models.
The difference between the capital required under Basel I and
Basel II was striking. For example, Basel II would allow banks using

96. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf?noframes=1.
97. Id. at 12.
98. Id. at 158.
99. Id. at 175.
100. Id. at 12–14.
101. Id. at 15.
102. Id. at 48.
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the simplified approach to cut the risk weight of mortgages from 50%
103
under Basel I to 35% under the simplified approach of Basel II.
In the United States, the Federal Reserve and the other banking
regulators agreed that only a handful of large, internationally active
banks would be required to use the IRB approach and that another
group of large banks would be allowed to voluntarily adopt the IRB
104
approach. All other banks in the United States would continue to
use the capital adequacy standards imposed by the Basel I Capital
105
Accord.
The SEC also allowed the CSEs that it regulated to use
internal risk models when calculating their capital requirements and
gave them far more flexibility than the Federal Reserve gave to the
106
FHCs and BHCs that it regulated.
The average leverage ratio for U.S. commercial banks in 2008 was
107
12 to 1. The firms regulated by the SEC as CSEs were allowed to be
substantially more leveraged than the firms regulated by the Federal
Reserve as FHCs or BHCs. The average leverage ratio for Bear
Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and
Morgan Stanley was 25.3 to 1, or more than double the average
108
leverage ratio for U.S. commercial banks.
OHFEO, which regulated the GSEs, also allowed them to be
considerably more leveraged than commercial banks were allowed to

103. Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Paul Atkinson, The Sub-Prime Crisis: Causal
Distortions and Regulatory Reform, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL OF 2007 AND
2008 55, 72 (Paul Bloxham & Christopher Kent eds., 2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/6/42031344.pdf.
104. See Risk Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework—
Basel II; Final Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288, 69,290, 69,297 (Dec. 7, 2007) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, pt. 208 and 225, pt. 325, pt. 559, 560, 563, 567) (discussing
the circumstances under which IRB adoption would be mandatory or permissive).
105. Id. at 69,297.
106. CSE Final Rule, supra note 67, at 34,428, 34,461; SIBHC Final Rule, supra
note 67, at 34,480–85; SEC IG’S CSE REPORT, supra note 70, at 19–20.
107. See Niall Ferguson, The Descent of Finance, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2009, at
44, 45, 48.
108. THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, INC., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 46 (2006), available
at
http://www.slideshare.net/QuarterlyEarningsReports3/bear-stearns-annualreport-2006; GOLDMAN SACHS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT i (2008), available at
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/investors/financials/archived/annualreports/2008-annual-report.html; LEHMAN BROS. HOLDINGS, INC., 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT 59 (2007), available at http://fclass.vaniercollege.qc.ca/~laroccag/FOV100043009/FOV100051364/Lehman%20Brothers%20yr%202007%20Annual%20Report.pdf?FCItemI
D=S002288FE&Plugin=Loft; MERRILL LYNCH, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 56 (2007),
available at http://www.ml.com/annualmeetingmaterials/2007/ar/download.asp;
Morgan Stanley, Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 80 (2006), available at
http://www.morganstanley.com/about/ir/shareholder/10k2006/10k11302006.pdf.
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be. In 2006, the leverage ratios for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
109
were 20.3 to 1 and 28.7 to 1.
Below is a sample of some of the major financial conglomerates in
the United States and their leverage ratios between 2000 and 2008.

109. FANNIE MAE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2006), available at
http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/annualreport/2006/2006_annual_report.pdf;
FREDDIE MAC, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2006), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/ar/pdf/2006annualrpt.pdf.
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Table 1: Leverage Ratios of a Sample of Large Financial Conglomerates

110

Financial
Institution
(Country)

Leverage Ratio
(Total Assets divided by Shareholders’ Equity (Deficit))
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000

American
International
111
Group (US)
Bank of
America Corp.
112
(US)
Bear Stearns
113
(US)
Citigroup
(US)114
Countrywide
Financial
115
(US)
Fannie Mae
(US)116

16.3

10.9

9.6

9.9

9.9

9.6

9.5

9.5

7.7

10.3

11.7

10.8

12.7

12.4

15.2

13.7

13.2

14.2

—

32.8

26.5

26.0

27.7

26.4

26.6

29.0

27.8

13.7

19.3

15.7

13.3

13.6

12.9

12.7

12.9

13.6

—

14.4

14.0

13.7

12.5

12.1

11.2

9.1

5.5

—

19.0

20.3

21.2

26.2

31.7

28.4

44.1

32.4

110. Any numbers in parentheses are negative.
111. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 192–93 (Mar. 2, 2009);
Am. Int’l Group, Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 102–03 (Mar. 1, 2007); Am.
Int’l Group, Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 102–103 (May 27, 2005); Am. Int’l
Group, Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 60–61 (Mar. 31, 2003); Am. Int’l Group,
Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 43–44 (Apr. 2, 2001).
112. BANK OF AM. CORP., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 26 (2008), available at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-reportsannual; BANK OF
AM. CORP., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (2006), available at http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-reportsannual; BANK OF AM. CORP., 2004
ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2004), available at http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-reportsannual.
113. The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-4 (Jan.
29, 2008); THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, INC., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 108,
at 46; The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-4 (Feb.
14, 2005); The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-4
(Feb. 28, 2003); The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at
49 (Feb. 28, 2001). Bear Stearns was acquired by J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. in 2007.
As result, there is no annual data for its leverage ratio in 2008.
114. CITIGROUP INC., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2008), available at
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/ar.htm;
Citigroup Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.01, at 3 (Sept. 9, 2005).
115. Countrywide Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 48 (Feb. 28, 2008);
Countrywide Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-4 (Mar. 19, 2003);
Countrywide Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-45 (Mar. 20, 2002).
Countrywide was acquired by Bank of America in 2008 and as a result, there is no
annual data for its leverage ratio in 2008. See BANK OF AM. CORP., 2008 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 112, at 5.
116. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-3 (Feb. 26, 2000)
[hereinafter Fannie Mae 10-K 2008 Report]; FANNIE MAE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
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Leverage Ratio
(Total Assets divided by Shareholders’ Equity (Deficit))
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
—
29.7
28.7
29.7
25.3
25.5
24.0
32.7
26.7
8.6
13.7

16.0
26.2

20.3
23.4

15.0
25.2

14.5
21.2

14.2
18.7

12.8
18.7

12.0
17.1

12.0
17.5

13.0

12.7

11.7

11.2

11.0

16.7

17.9

16.9

16.9

note 109, at 1; Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 89, F-3 (2004);
FANNIE MAE, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2001), available at
http://www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/ir/annualreport/2001/fullreport.pdf;jsessi
onid=WDJ1IWA5ZG4OPJ2FECISFGA. Fannie Mae had no shareholders’ equity in
2008 but, in fact, had a shareholders’ deficit. Fannie Mae 10-K 2008 Report, supra, at
F-3. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that Fannie Mae’s and Freddie
Mac’s combined leverage ratio, including all of the loans that they owned and had
guaranteed, equaled 75 to 1. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT xx (2011), available at http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf
[hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
117. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 58 (Mar. 11,
2009), [hereinafter Freddie Mac 2008 10-K Report]; FREDDIE MAC, 2006 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 109, at 22; FREDDIE MAC, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (2004).
Freddie Mac had no shareholders’ equity in 2008 but, in fact, had a shareholders’
deficit. Freddie Mac 2008 10-K Report, supra at 58. As noted in above, the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission found that Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s combined
leverage ratio, including all of the loans that they owned and guaranteed, equaled
75:1. FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at xx.
118. GMAC, LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 26 (Feb. 27, 2009); GMAC,
LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Mar. 16, 2005).
119. GOLDMAN SACHS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 108, at i; GOLDMAN SACHS,
2005 ANNUAL REPORT i (2005), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ourfirm/investors/financials/archived/annual-reports/2005-annual-report.html;
GOLDMAN SACHS, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (2002), available at
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/investors/financials/archived/annualreports/attachments/2002-annual-report.pdf; GOLDMAN SACHS, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT
37 (2000), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ourfirm/investors/financials/archived/annual-reports/2000-annual-report.html.
120. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (2008), available at
http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/annual.cfm; J.P. MORGAN CHASE &
CO., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 83 (2003), available at
http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/annual.cfm; J.P. MORGAN CHASE &
CO., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2000), available at http://www.ba.hokkai-su.ac.jp/~aono/30jpannual2000.pdf.
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Financial
Institution
(Country)

Leverage Ratio
(Total Assets divided by Shareholders’ Equity (Deficit))
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000

Lehman
Brothers
Holdings
121
(US)
Merrill Lynch
122
(US)
Morgan Stanley
(US)123
Wachovia
124
Corp. (US)
Washington
125
Mutual (US)

24.3

30.7

26.2

24.4

23.9

23.7

29.1

29.3

28.9

33.4

27.8

19.9

17.9

18.5

16.3

17.6

18.5

19.4

11.4

32.6

30.4

30.5

26.8

23.0

24.5

23.6

22.1

—

10.2

10.1

10.9

12.1

11.2

10.7

11.6

16.6

—

13.3

12.8

12.6

14.7

14.2

13.3

17.2

19.2

121. LEHMAN BROS. HOLDINGS, INC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 108, at 29;
Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 28 (Feb. 14, 2005).
The leverage ratio for 2008 is for the quarter ending May 31, 2008. Lehman Bros.
Holdings, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 55 (July 10, 2008).
122. Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 53–54 (Feb. 24, 2009)
(leverage ratio for 2008 calculated by dividing total assets by total shareholders’
equity); MERRILL LYNCH & CO., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 108, at 56; MERRILL
LYNCH & CO., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 47 (2005), available at
http://www.ml.com/annualmeetingmaterials/2005/ar/download.asp;
MERRILL
LYNCH & CO., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2003), available at
http://www.ml.com/annualmeetingmaterials/2003/ar/pdf.asp; MERRILL LYNCH &
CO., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 32 (2001), available at
http://www.ml.com/annualmeetingmaterials/annrep2001/ar-pdf/ml-annual.pdf.
123. Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 75 (Jan. 28, 2009); MORGAN
STANLEY, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT supra note 108, at 80; Morgan Stanley, Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 68 (Feb. 10, 2005); Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at
51 (Feb. 19, 2003); Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K),
at 22 (Feb. 16, 2001) (leverage ratio for 2000 calculated by dividing total assets by
total shareholders’ equity).
124. WACHOVIA, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, at 1 (2007), available at
https://www.wachovia.com/file/2007_Wachovia_Annual_Report.pdf;
WACHOVIA,
2004 ANNUAL REPORT 68 (2004), available at
https://www.wachovia.com/file/2004_annualreport.pdf; WACHOVIA, 2002 ANNUAL
REPORT 1 (2002), available at
https://www.wachovia.com/file/WB2002annualreport.pdf; WACHOVIA, 2000 ANNUAL
REPORT 1 (2000), available at
https://www.wachovia.com/common_files/fullar2000.pdf (Wachovia was formed by
the merger of First Union and the former Wachovia, First Union changed its name
to Wachovia after the merger). Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008 and as
a result, it did not publish a 2008 annual report containing its 2008 leverage ratio.
For information about its acquisition by Wells Fargo, see WELLS FARGO & CO., 2008
ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2008), available at
https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/invest_relations/wf2008annualreport.
pdf.
125. Washington Mut., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 9 (May 22, 2008);
Washington Mut., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 78 (Mar. 13, 2003);
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Leverage Ratio
(Total Assets divided by Shareholders’ Equity (Deficit))
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
13.2
12.1
10.5
11.8
11.3
11.3
11.5
11.3
10.3

The above ratios are based on firms’ publicly disclosed financial
statements, which frequently obscured the true levels of leverage at
these institutions because accounting rules allowed these entities to
exclude a host of off-balance sheet commitments. When these
commitments are taken into account, the picture can change
dramatically. For example, according to the Bridgewater Financial
Group, Bank of America’s leverage ratio in September 2008 was 134
to 1 when its off-balance sheet commitments were taken into
127
account.
In addition, some institutions deliberately manipulated their
balance sheets to inflate the value of assets and engaged in other
128
accounting irregularities.
For example, Lehman Brothers parked
$50 billion off of its balance sheets by using Repo 105 transactions, a
129
type of repurchase agreement. According to Martin Kelly, Lehman

Washington Mut., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 56 (Feb. 20, 2001).
Washington Mutual was acquired by J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. in 2008 and as a result,
it did not publish a 2008 annual report containing its 2008 leverage ratio. For
information about its acquisition by J.P. Morgan Chase, see J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO.,
2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at 10–11.
126. WELLS FARGO & CO., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT supra note 124, at 87; WELLS FARGO
& CO., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 69 (2006), available at
https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/invest_relations/wf2006annualreport.
pdf; WELLS FARGO & CO., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 63 (2004), available at
http://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/invest_relations/wf2004annualreport.p
df; WELLS FARGO & CO., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 61 (2002), available at
http://www.wellsfargo.com/annual2002.pdf; WELLS FARGO & CO., 2001 ANNUAL
REPORT 55 (2001), available at
https://www.wellsfargo.com/pdf/invest_relations/wf_2001narrative.pdf.
127. See Ferguson, supra note 98, at 44, 48.
128. Mike Spector, Susanne Craig, & Peter Lattman, Examiner: Lehman Torpedoed
Lehman, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703625304575115963009594440.h
tml?mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTWhatsNews.
129. Id. A repo is a repurchase agreement. Under a repo, one party sells assets to
another and agrees that it will buy back those assets within a fixed period of time. See
Gary Gorton, Questions and Answers About the Financial Crisis (Feb. 20, 2010), available
at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/crisisqa0210.pdf; Gary
Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Haircuts 1 (forthcoming, Yale ICF, Working Paper No.
09-15, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447438. Repos are effectively
loans of money for very short periods of time with the assets sold serving as collateral,
which the buyer can sell to someone else if the original seller defaults on its promise
to repurchase the assets. U.S. generally accepted accounting practices (U.S. GAAP)
allow the entity selling the assets to treat the transaction as a “sale” and move the
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Brothers’ global financial controller, the Repo 105 transactions had
“no substance” and “the only purpose or motive for the transactions
130
was reduction in balance sheet.”
Lehman Brothers was not the only financial conglomerate that
131
relied heavily on repos and took substantial haircuts on the repos
into which it entered. All of the financial conglomerates that were
regulated by the SEC as CSEs relied heavily on repos for funding. In
2007 Goldman Sachs had repo transactions on its balance sheet
132
worth 3.7 times its total shareholders’ equity or $159.2 billion.
After becoming a BHC in 2008, Goldman Sachs reduced the amount
of repo agreements on its balance sheet to less than its total
shareholders’ equity, which represented a 60% reduction to $62.9
133
billion.
Even some FHCs and BHCs regulated by the Federal Reserve used
repos extensively, although not as much as the CSEs. Citigroup had
repo transactions on its balance sheet worth 2.7 times the value of its
134
total shareholders’ equity, or $304.2 billion. Bank of America had
repo transactions on its balance sheet worth 1.5 times the value of its
135
total shareholders’ equity, or $221.4 billion.
The heavy reliance of many financial conglomerates on repos for
funding and to hide how leveraged they were made them particularly
vulnerable in the event of a liquidity crisis because if a financial firm’s
counterparties decided not to renew or rollover the repurchase
agreements, it could easily bankrupt a firm that relied heavily on
these agreements as a source of funds. Lehman Brothers illustrated
this. At the end of 2007, Lehman Brothers disclosed that it had
assets given as collateral off of its balance sheet if the value of the assets exceeds
102% of the cash received for them and a law firm has issued a true sale opinion that
the transactions meets all of the legal requirements for a sale. See Spector, Craig, &
Lattman, supra note 128. The difference between the value of the assets exchanged
and the cash received is called a “haircut.” Gorton, supra, at 12; Gorton & Metrick,
supra, at 2. Larger haircuts are required the riskier the buyer considers the
transaction or the seller. Gorton, supra, at 12; Gorton & Metrick, supra, at 2. A Repo
105 transaction is one in which the value of the assets given as collateral equaled
105% of the cash received in exchange for the assets. Spector, Craig, & Lattman,
supra note 128.
130. Id.
131. The difference between the value of the assets exchanged and the cash
received as part of a repurchase agreement is called a “haircut”. Gorton, supra note
129, at 12; Gorton & Metrick, supra note 129, at 2.
132. GOLDMAN SACHS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 87 (2007), available at
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/investors/financials/archived/annualreports/2007-annual-report.html.
133. GOLDMAN SACHS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT supra note 108, at 77.
134. Citigroup, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 106 (Feb. 22, 2008).
135. BANK OF AMERICA, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 39 (2007), available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/71/71595/reports/2007_AR.pdf.
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$181.7 billion in repo transactions on its balance sheet, up 36% from
136
the amount that it held at the end of 2006. These repos were worth
eight times as much as Lehman Brothers’ total shareholders’
137
equity.
As a result, Lehman Brothers could be, and was,
bankrupted overnight when its counterparties refused to renew or
138
enter into new repurchase agreements with it.
Empirical research has found evidence of how the reliance on
139
repos put pressure on the financial stability of other conglomerates.
This research discovered that, during the financial crisis, repos
experienced “runs” as counterparties demanded significantly larger
140
haircuts in order to enter into such agreements or to renew them.
By January 2009, the average repo haircut on securitized bonds and
141
other structured debt was about 45%.
The larger haircuts forced
many firms to sell assets at the same time, which depressed the prices
142
for those assets. The firms forced to take these haircuts and engage
in these sales found themselves in precarious financial positions.
Repos did not play a direct role in the financial problems of THCs
like Washington Mutual (WaMu) and of BHCs like Wachovia because
143
they did not rely on repos for a significant portion of their funding.
Repos, however, did play an indirect role in the troubles of those
financial institutions because repos helped cause Lehman Brothers’
collapse, which in turn led to silent bank runs on WaMu and

136. LEHMAN BROS. HOLDINGS, INC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 108, at 79.
137. Id. at 79.
138. See Gorton, supra note 129, at 12–13 (discussing the increasing size of haircuts
as creating a run on the repo); Morgan Housel, Lehman Brothers and the Age of
Stupidity, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 11, 2009),
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2009/09/11/lehman-brothers-and-the-ageof-stupidity.aspx.
139. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 129, at 1.
140. Gorton, supra note 129, at 13. Haircuts mean that the firms were getting a
smaller amount of cash for the collateral that they were putting up. Id. at 12–14. For
example, if the firms were putting up $1 trillion but taking a 45% haircut, then they
would only be receiving $550 billion in exchange for the collateral that they put up.
In order to make up the $450 billion cash short fall, the firms would have to borrow
those funds from other sources or sell assets.
141. Id. at 13.
142. Id. at 5, 12–14.
143. WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT AND FORM 10-K 104 (2007)
(demonstrating that Washington Mutual had only US $4.1 billion in repos at the end
of 2007, a figure less than half the amount it had at the end of 2006, and
representing only about 17% of its total shareholders’ equity); WACHOVIA, 2007
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 124, at 71, 101 (demonstrating that Wachovia also had a
small amount of repos, only US $29.3 billion, on its balance sheet at the end of 2007,
which represented less than 40% of its total shareholders’ equity).
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144

Wachovia.
As a result of these runs, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
145
purchased WaMu and Wells Fargo purchased Wachovia.
B. Lack of Coordination Among Regulators
The United States did not have a forum or a body to coordinate
the regulatory and supervisory activities of its vast array of financial
services regulators to address the unique problems posed by financial
146
conglomerates.
It did have several forums that brought together
some, but not all, of the financial regulators: the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), the President’s Working
Group on Financial Markets (“the President’s Working Group”), the
Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee
(FBIIC), the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, the
North American Securities Administrators’ Association (NASAA), the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), and National
147
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).
None of these groups had the authority, jurisdiction or resources
to ensure the systematic sharing of information between all of
holding company regulators and the relevant functional or
institutional regulators. As a result, it was difficult for the plethora of
agencies to coordinate their activities and to assess the systemic risks
144. Washington Mutual (“WaMu”) failed after depositors pulled US $16.7 billion
out of the bank in the ten days following Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Robin Sidel,
David Enrich & Dan Fitzgerald, WaMu is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest
Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122238415586576687.html
That represented
almost 9% of the bank’s total deposits as of its last quarterly report on June 30, 2008.
Id. WaMu was in a weakened state before Lehman’s failure as it had posted a second
quarter 2008 loss of US $3.3 billion and was predicted to lose US $19 billion between
2008 and 2010 because it held US $53 billion in option adjustable rate mortgages
and US $16.1 billion in mortgages to subprime borrowers that were some of the most
vulnerable to defaults. Id. After the bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers and WaMu,
Wachovia experienced a silent run on the bank as depositors withdrew billions of
dollars in deposits, including US $5 billion in a single day on September 26, 2008.
Rick Rothacker, $5 Billion Withdrawn in One Day in Silent Run, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Oct. 11, 2008, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2008/10/11/246983/5-billionwithdrawn-in-one-day.html.
145. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo and Wachovia Merger Completed
(Jan. 1, 2009), available at
https://www.wellsfargo.com/press/2009/20090101_Wachovia_Merger.
146. See Brown, supra note 6, at 28–30.
147. See Brown, supra note 6, at 29; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61,
FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S.
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 97–108 (2004) [hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION].
NAIC, NASAA and CSBS are the associations for the state insurance, securities, and
banking regulators, respectively. The Financial Literacy and Education Commission
was created by Congress to coordinate efforts to educate the public on financial
matters and is composed of 20 federal agencies, including all of the federal financial
regulators. GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra, at 108.
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148

to the financial industry as a whole.
In fact, inter-agency rivalries
had undermined efforts to expand the scope and composition of
these groups in order to provide that kind of strategic assessment of
149
the financial industry’s risks.
With regard to these inter-agency forums, the President’s Working
Group came the closest to creating a forum for strategically
addressing the issues facing the financial services industry. It was this
entity to which President George W. Bush turned in August 2007 to
150
investigate the underlying causes of the financial crisis.
The
President’s Working Group was comprised of the Treasury
151
It did
Department, the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and the CFTC.
not contain any representatives from the OTS nor from any of state
152
banking, securities, or insurance regulators.
FFIEC was created on March 10, 1979 as a result of the Financial
153
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978.
FFIEC is comprised of the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the NCUA, the
OCC, and the OTS, but it does not include the SEC, the CFTC, or
154
any representatives from the state securities or insurance regulators.
In 2006, the FFIEC added a representative from the State Liaison
Committee, which includes representatives from the state banking,
155
thrift, and credit union regulators, as a new voting member.
Consequently, the FFIEC could only deal effectively with a limited
range of issues because not all state and federal financial regulators
156
are members of FFIEC.
The FFIEC had limited authority to recommend regulations to
157
Its
govern the regulation and supervision of holding companies.
mission is to prescribe uniform principles and standards for the
examination of depository institutions and to coordinate their
148. GAO FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION REPORT, supra note 64, at 97.
149. Brown, supra note 6, at 30.
150. THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT
ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS i (2008), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_0312200
8.pdf.
151. Working Group on Financial Markets, 53 Fed. Reg. 9421 (Mar. 22, 1988).
152. See id. (denoting the participants of the President’s Working Group: the
Federal Reserve, the SEC, the Treasury Department, and the CFTC).
153. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 226 (2006)).
154. BANKING AGENCY OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., JOINT EVALUATION OF
THE FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL 3–4 (2002) [hereinafter
OIG FFIEC REPORT].
155. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.ffiec.gov.
156. OIG FFIEC REPORT, supra note 154, at 10.
157. Id. at 9.
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158

regulatory efforts.
Thus, it could only recommend holding
company regulations to the extent that they pertained to the
regulation of depository institutions. In addition, the FFIEC could
not compel its members to adopt a particular proposal, but served
159
only as a coordinating and policy-making entity for its members.
Because FFIEC lacked rulemaking authority, each of the relevant
agencies had to agree to jointly issue rules for any projects requiring
160
inter-agency cooperation.
Finally, FFIEC’s effectiveness on the issues with which it does deal
161
has been contingent on who the members are at a given time.
A
2002 joint report of the banking agencies’ Offices of Inspectors
General evaluating the performance of the FFIEC noted:
A number of the officials noted that the Council’s success
depended in large part on the individual principal’s interaction
and level of commitment to the FFIEC. One senior agency official
indicated that while the FFIEC exists in law, in practice the FFIEC
exists at the consent of the Council and task force members. One
principal stated that personal relationships are important at all
levels of the FFIEC and that without good relationships there is no
162
basis for completing interagency projects.

As a result, the effectiveness of the FFIEC could be, and on
occasion was, undermined by cooperation and coordination
problems.
FBIIC was created following the September 11, 2001 attacks and
was tasked with ensuring the preparedness and stability of the
163
financial sector in the event of future threats.
FBIIC drew its
members from a wider range of financial regulators than either the
President’s Working Group or FFIEC. FBIIC is comprised of
representatives from the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, OTS, SEC,
CFTC, NCUA, NAIC, CSBS, OFHEO, the Federal Housing Finance
Board, the Office of Homeland Security, and the Office of
164
Cyberspace Security.
Nevertheless, FBIIC’s narrow mission prevented it from having
much say in how agencies should regulate financial conglomerates.
FBIIC’s mission is: “Working with appropriate members of financial

158. Id. at 3.
159. 12 U.S.C. § 3305 (2006).
160. OIG FFIEC REPORT, supra note 154, at 9.
161. Id. at 7.
162. Id.
163. Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age, 66 Fed. Reg.
53,063–71 (Oct. 18, 2001).
164. GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 147, at 107.
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institution regulatory agencies, coordinate efforts to improve the
165
It
reliability and security of financial information infrastructure.”
focuses on protecting the financial information infrastructure, which
only tangentially touches upon financial conglomerate regulation.
As a result of the absence of any forum encouraging the holding
company regulators to coordinate their regulations, the holding
company regulators made little effort to do so. Consequently, they
missed opportunities to learn from each other’s experiences and to
develop a set of best practices for regulating financial conglomerates.
In addition, the holding company regulators, particularly the OTS
and the SEC, used the differences in regulatory regimes to compete
166
with one another for firms.
This competition exacerbated the
regulatory arbitrage problem.
C. Failure to Understand Risks Posed by Functional Subsidiaries
The regulatory agencies generally examined the holding
companies under their supervision on a consolidated basis and
deferred to the relevant agencies to examine the functional
subsidiaries in more detail. This situation was mandated in the laws
outlining the duties of the agencies under GLBA and other laws.
When Congress enacted the GLBA, it attempted to preserve the
regulatory authority of the functional regulators.
The problem with this system is that the functional regulators were
not tasked with examining whether the entities that they regulated
posed risks to the larger financial groups in which they were
members, or whether they potentially could pose systemic risks. The
holding company regulators, who were responsible for determining
whether the financial conglomerates posed systemic risks, were
forced to rely on reports concerning subsidiaries by agencies that
were not drafting them with these risks in mind. This gap between
the goals of these different agencies meant that subsidiaries could
pose systemic risks that would go unnoticed by the relevant
regulators.
In addition, as already noted in the case of Enron’s derivative
subsidiaries, some subsidiaries lacked a functional regulator. In those
cases, the financial services holding company regulators had some
ability to examine those subsidiaries. The problem in those cases was
that the financial services holding company regulators often lacked

165. About FBIIC, Mission, FIN. AND BANKING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE COMM.
(Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.fbiic.gov/about/mission.htm.
166. FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at 154.
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personnel with the expertise to understand those subsidiaries and
how they operated.
AIG Financial Products Corp. provides an example of this problem.
AIG was regulated by the OTS, but its subsidiary, AIG Financial
Products Corp., was subject to regulation by the SEC. The SEC,
however, was only responsible for regulating those parts of its
business that dealt with securities. The SEC did not regulate AIG
Financial Product’s derivative products, such as credit default swaps.
Prior to 2000, the CFTC was considering regulating derivatives, but,
as already mentioned, the Commodities Futures Modernization Act
of 2000 specifically prevented the CFTC or any other federal agency
from regulating derivatives. As a result, AIG Financial Products had
no functional regulator for its derivatives business.
Evaluating the risks posed by AIG Financial Products’ derivatives
business fell to the OTS examiners, who supervised AIG as a THC.
Unfortunately, the OTS lacked personnel with the necessary
expertise to adequately evaluate the risks posed by the derivatives
being traded by AIG Financial Products. The personnel at the OTS
primarily dealt with savings and loans associations, which offered
products and services similar to banks. In connection with evaluating
these entities, OTS examiners needed to have some understanding of
derivatives because federal regulations permitted savings and loans
167
associations to use derivatives under certain circumstances.
In
general, the regulations allowed a savings association to invest in
financial derivatives if it was “authorized to invest in the assets
underlying the financial derivative, the transaction is safe and sound,”
168
and it met any other requirements in the regulations. Savings and
loans could only invest in derivatives for the purpose of reducing
169
their risk exposure. The definition of financial derivatives included
“futures, forward commitments, options, and swaps” but expressly
excluded all mortgage derivative securities, including collateralized
170
mortgage obligations.
In addition, to the guidance provided by
these regulations, OTS examiners were given an Examination
Handbook that provided additional directions for what they were to
look for with regard to derivatives when examining a savings
171
association.
Even though the regulations excluded mortgage

167. 12 C.F.R. § 563.172 (2010).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 660.1–.32 (2001)
[hereinafter OTS, EXAMINATION HANDBOOK] (demonstrating that this handbook was
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derivative securities from the definition of financial derivatives, the
Examination Handbook did provide some guidance for how
examiners should evaluate the use of such instruments by a savings
172
association.
Unfortunately, this guidance was slightly less than a
173
page long.
The OTS’s Holding Companies Handbook did not provide
significantly more guidance than that offered by the Examination
Handbook. The Holding Companies Handbook was designed to
provide guidance for OTS examiners who were evaluating risks posed
by the THCs supervised by OTS. The handbook contains fewer than
174
ten pages that even refer to derivatives. Even when it does refer to
derivatives, it provides little guidance regarding how OTS examiners
should evaluate the risks posed by such products. For example, in
the Risk Management section, the Holding Companies Handbook
advises examiners that:
Risk limits are a necessary component of an effective risk
management program. You should identify board-approved risk
limits and ensure that senior management adopts, communicates,
and monitors operations to ensure compliance with those limits.
You should verify that the risk limits are commensurate with the
goals and objectives of the enterprise as well as its financial
175
strength and staff expertise.

The only time that the Risk Management section specifically
mentions derivatives is when it notes that it is common for the board
of directors of the holding company to place size limits on the
176
derivatives portfolio.
In the Earnings section, the handbook
instructs examiners to look for “high risk, cyclical or off-balance sheet
activities that could adversely affect the company, causing additional
pressure on other subsidiaries, including the thrift” and notes that
177
derivatives usually fall within this category. The section on financial
conglomerates in the OTS’s Holding Companies Handbook discusses
derivatives on four of its eighteen pages and in those instances, it is
designed only to provide guidance for an examination of the savings association and
for evaluating a THC and all of its subsidiaries). OTS did have another handbook
that provided guidance for holding company examinations. OFFICE OF THRIFT
SUPERVISION, HOLDING COMPANIES HANDBOOK 100 (2009) [hereinafter OTS, HOLDING
COMPANIES HANDBOOK].
172. OTS, EXAMINATION HANDBOOK, supra note 171, at 660.30.
173. Id.
174. See OTS, HOLDING COMPANIES HANDBOOK, supra note 171, at 400.12, 500.7,
600.4–.5, 940.9, 940.15, 940.17–.18 (demonstrating that the portions of the
handbook dealing with derivatives date from November 2003 to March 2009).
175. Id. at 500.6–.7.
176. Id. at 500.7.
177. Id. at 600.4–.5.
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mainly suggesting generic questions that examiners should ask about
178
the conglomerate’s derivative positions.
The derivatives rules for savings associations found in the
Examination Handbook and the Holding Companies Handbook did
not prepare OTS examiners adequately for dealing with the complex
derivative products offered by AIG Financial Products. Not only did
AIG Financial Products invest in collateralized debt obligations
(“CDOs”) that were similar to collateralized mortgage obligations
because they were partly backed by mortgage securities, but it
provided credit default swaps (“CDSs”) for CDOs to protect against
the decline in value of the mortgage-backed securities upon which
179
the CDOs were based.
The section of the OTS’s Holding Companies Handbook dealing
with financial conglomerates recognizes that financial conglomerates
pose unique challenges and encourages examiners to adopt a
broader view when examining financial conglomerates. It notes:
“[t]his shift from managing along legal entity lines to functional lines
means that the information and conclusions drawn during the
examinations of individual entities within the conglomerate may be
incomplete unless understood in the context of the examination
180
findings of other related legal entities or centralized functions.” It
later notes that “[t]he rapidly changing environment of a
conglomerate means that we will need to increase planning and
offsite monitoring” but in the very next paragraph it states that OTS
“will use a more formalized annual supervisory planning process in
181
supervising conglomerates.” These two statements are at odds with
one another. The former would suggest that OTS recognized that
circumstances of some financial businesses, like derivatives, might
change rapidly. Unfortunately, the later statement seems to indicate
that OTS did not really follow through with this flexible approach but
relied instead on a rigid, formalistic examination process.
Even with this formal, annual process, OTS should have been put
on notice of troubles in AIG Financial Products if it had understood
the derivatives business. AIG’s board of directors had requested that
AIG’s CEO Martin Sullivan impose tighter controls on AIG Financial

178. See id. at 940.9, 940.15, 940.17–.18 (this part of the handbook dates from
November 2003 because it was not updated when other sections, like the Risk
Management section, were updated in March 2009).
179. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at xxiv–xxv, 273–74 (describing AIG’s
financial portfolio and its effect on the financial stability of AIG).
180. OTS, HOLDING COMPANIES HANDBOOK, supra note 171, at 940.1.
181. Id.
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182

Products as early as 2005, but he never did.
In addition, AIG
Financial Products began receiving significant collateral calls in
183
connection with its derivatives over a year before AIG’s collapse.
AIG Financial Products had invested in subprime mortgage-backed
184
The OTS,
securities that became impossible to sell in 2007.
however, does not appear to have considered the derivatives business
of AIG Financial Products as posing a serious threat to the existence
of AIG and its other subsidiaries during the period from 2005 and
185
2008.
OTS conducted an examination of AIG in March 2008 and
downgraded its composite rating from a “2” (“fundamentally sound”)
to a “3” (“moderate to severe supervisory concern”) but concluded
186
that it was likely that AIG would remain a viable business.
Within
six months, however, AIG had collapsed and been taken over by the
187
U.S. government.
The lesson from AIG is that holding companies regulators need to
have the ability to examine all of the subsidiaries of the holding
companies that they regulate and need to have personnel with the
requisite expertise to understand these subsidiaries’ businesses. If
they had those two things, then they might have uncovered and dealt
with the problems brewing in some of the troubled conglomerates
before those problems severely imperiled the firms.
D. Regulatory Arbitrage
Prior to the crisis, regulatory arbitrage was cast as “regulatory
competition” and advocated as a positive feature of the U.S.
188
regulatory structure.
Alan Greenspan argued that regulatory
arbitrage prevented overregulation because regulators that placed
“excessive” burdens on firms would lose those firms to other
189
agencies.
Regulatory arbitrage, however, did not always lead to the right
amount of regulation; in many instances, it resulted in underregulation. In the case of holding company regulators, regulatory
arbitrage allowed firms to find the regulator that would be most
182. BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE 329 (2010).
183. Id. at 330–41.
184. Id. at 328.
185. See id. at 94–95 (showing that in general, OTS had a blind spot with regard to
subprime mortgages because while the OCC discouraged the entities that it
supervised from making subprime loans, the OTS did nothing to deter the thrifts
and THCs that it supervised from doing so).
186. FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at 274.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 54.
189. Id.

BROWN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS

5/17/2011 6:48 PM

1375

accommodating to their needs, which usually translated into the
190
AIG chose to
regulator offering the weakest level of regulation.
own a thrift, rather than a bank, because the OTS would then
regulate the company as a THC. AIG perceived the OTS to be a
191
weaker regulator than the Federal Reserve. The investment banks,
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, chose to own industrial loan
companies or thrifts rather than banks because they wanted to be
subject to the voluntary regulatory regime of the SEC, which was
significantly weaker than the regime imposed by the Federal Reserve
192
on FHCs and BHCs or the regime imposed by the OTS on THCs.
In a survey conducted by the Federal Reserve, the CSEs stated that
they did not want to be regulated by the Federal Reserve because its
regulation was more comprehensive than either the SEC’s or the
193
OTS’s approach.
The federal agencies had incentives to compete for firms because
their budgets and prestige were tied up with how many firms they
194
regulated and who they regulated.
The OTS’s budget was directly
195
tied to the assessments that it levied on the firms that it regulated.
The SEC also collects fees from the firms that it regulates but it does
not get to control what portion of those fees that it keeps for
196
197
budgetary purposes.
The SEC’s budget is set by Congress.
The
firms regulated by the SEC have shown no hesitation about
aggressively lobbying Congress to curtail the SEC’s budget if they
believe that the SEC is considering imposing regulations that they
198
view as burdensome.
The Federal Reserve had few incentives to compete with the OTS
and the SEC because even though fees collected from the banks and
holding companies regulated by the Federal Reserve help fund its
operations, the vast majority of the Federal Reserve’s revenues come
199
from earnings on its portfolio of government securities.
In

190. Id. at 40, 352.
191. Id. at 352.
192. See id. at 150–54 (describing the decision of the five major U.S. investment
banks to choose to be regulated by the SEC as opposed to other regulating entities).
193. Id. at 154.
194. Id. at 54.
195. Id.
196. U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
92 (2010).
197. Id.
198. Brown, supra note 6, at 51 (describing the lobbying efforts aimed at the SEC’s
budget in the 1990s to head off new regulations).
199. U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL REPORT: BUDGET
REVIEW 1, 25 (2008).
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addition, the Federal Reserve has complete control over its budget
and, therefore, is not subject to the pressures faced by the SEC.
These two factors made the Federal Reserve less prone to agency
capture than either the OTS or the SEC. Consequently, it is not
surprising that the Federal Reserve would impose stronger
regulations on the holding companies that it regulated than either
the OTS or the SEC.
The impact of regulatory arbitrage can be seen in Table 2, which
lists the twenty largest financial conglomerates by revenues in 2007.
Eight of these twenty conglomerates were regulated by either the
SEC, the OTS, or both, and not by the Federal Reserve. The OTS
and the SEC lacked the budgetary resources, the personnel, and the
experience of the Federal Reserve.
These eight financial
conglomerates deliberately chose the OTS and the SEC because they
believed that the OTS and the SEC would allow them to engage in
activities, such as higher levels of leverage in the case of the SEC and
the CSEs under its supervision, than the Federal Reserve would have
201
allowed.

200. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT AND SUBSIDY COSTS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE’S ACTION DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 3 (2010) (noting that the
Federal Reserve is not subject to the appropriations process and it is able to operate
independently from government influence).
201. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at 151–54 (discussing the positive reaction
of the investment banks to the creation of the CSE program and how it differed from
banking regulations); see also SEC IG’S CSE REPORT, supra note 70, at 4 (“The firms
agreed to consolidated supervision because of the preferential capital treatment
under the alternative method and international requirements.”); id. at 19–20 (noting
that the SEC had not imposed a leverage limit on the CSEs unlike the banking
regulators who had imposed leverage limits on banks).
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Table 2: Twenty Largest Financial Conglomerates by Revenue in 2007
Name

Primary
Industry
Sector

Revenues as
of 2007
($ millions)

Profits as of
2007
($ millions)

General
Electric
Company
Citigroup

Diversified
Financial

176,656

22,208

Banking

159,229

3,617

Banking

119,190

14,982

Insurance

118,245

13,213

Banking

116,353

15,365

Insurance

110,064

6,200

Federal
Reserve, SEC
OTS

Securities

87,968

11,599

SEC

Securities
Securities
Insurance

87,879
64,217
61,612

3,209
(7,777)
5,464

Securities

59,003

4,192

SEC, OTS
SEC, OTS
Federal
Reserve
SEC, OTS

Banking

55,528

6,312

Wells Fargo

Banking

53,593

8,057

MetLife

Insurance

53,150

4,317

Fannie Mae

Diversified
Financial

43,355

(2,050)

Bank of
America Corp.
Berkshire
Hathaway
JP Morgan
Chase & Co.
American
International
Group
Goldman Sachs
Group
Morgan Stanley
Merrill Lynch
State Farm
Insurance Cos.
Lehman
Brothers
Holdings
Wachovia Corp.

Federal
Holding
Company
Regulators
OTS

Federal
Reserve, SEC
Federal
Reserve
None

Federal
Reserve
Federal
Reserve
Federal
Reserve
OHFEO

202. INS. INFO. INST., supra note 17, at 9; Bank Holding Companies Name List, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO,
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/banking/financial_institution_rep
orts/bhc_name.txt (last visited Apr. 25, 2011); Financial Holding Companies as of Mar
23, 2011, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/fhc/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); GAO
FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION REPORT, supra note 64, at 12; Institution Directory,
FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
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Name

Primary
Industry
Sector

Revenues as
of 2007
($ millions)

Profits as of
2007
($ millions)

Freddie Mac

Diversified
Financial
Insurance

43,104

(3,094)

36,769

4,636

Insurance

34,401

3,704

Diversified
Financial
Diversified
Financial

32,316

4,012

31,490

(2,332)

Allstate
Prudential
Financial
American
Express
GMAC

[Vol. 60:1339
Federal
Holding
Company
Regulators
OHFEO
Federal
Reserve
OTS
Federal
Reserve
OTS

At the end of the day, domestic regulatory arbitrage provides a
partial explanation regarding why competing firms were regulated by
different agencies and subject to different regulatory standards, as
discussed in Part II.A above. Another part of the puzzle comes from
international regulatory arbitrage.
During the decade leading up to the crisis, the competition among
U.S. domestic regulators was made more contentious by the fact that
the United States and the United Kingdom were engaged in a
struggle to see who would be the primary financial services
marketplace in the world. Private groups and government officials
conducted major studies on competitiveness to assess the relative
203
advantages of the United Kingdom and the United States.
203. For some examples of these reports, see HM TREASURY, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN
LONDON: GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (2006), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/media/1E0/E6/bud06_cityoflondon_262.pdf
[hereinafter UK
TREASURY FINANCIAL SERVICES REPORT]; MCKINSEY & CO. & NEW YORK CITY ECON. DEV.
CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP
(2007),
available
at
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL116000pub/materials/library/
NY_Schumer-Bloomberg_REPORT_FINAL.pdf.; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG.,
INTERIM REPORT (2006); COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG., THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF
THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET (2007) [hereinafter COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS.,
COMPETITIVE POSITION REPORT]; COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS.
IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007); RICHARD M.
KOVACEVICH ET. AL., THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FINANCIAL COMPETITIVENESS (2007);
Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is the Financial
Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
369 (2008); Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Market for Securities Laws, 75
U. CHI L. REV. 1435 (2008); Stephen J. Choi, Channeling Competition in the Global
Securities Market, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 111 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards
the Top? The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International
Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM L. REV. 1757 (2002); James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S.
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This competition between the United Kingdom and the United
States tended to focus on a relatively narrow range of financial
204
products and services, such as securities and stock exchanges.
It
frequently was reduced to nothing more than a competition between
London and New York for which had the most listed companies on its
stock exchanges.
Because of this focus on securities, the SEC was particularly keen to
help U.S. financial conglomerates, like the investment banks Bear
Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley. It
not only created the CSE regulatory structure for them so that they
could avoid being regulated under the EU Financial Conglomerate
Directive, but it set significantly lower capital requirements for them
205
than those imposed by the Federal Reserve on FHCs and BHCs.
It is worth noting that this competition was not really about
competition between American and British financial firms. American
financial conglomerates often were the ones pushing this
competition—and the deregulation that it sought to foster—on both
sides of the Atlantic. Prior to the financial crisis, branches or
subsidiaries of foreign banks, many of which were American,
comprised over 75% of the banks authorized to do business within
206
the United Kingdom.
In the wake of the Big Bang, pursuant to
which the U.K. government significantly deregulated the country’s
financial markets, foreign firms acquired or put out of business most
207
of the major U.K. investment banks.
Barclays’ acquisition of large

Securities Laws in the Shadow of International Regulatory Competition, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157 (1992); Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C.
L. REV. 89 (2007); Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1817 (2007); Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium,
105 MICH L. REV. 1858 (2007); Larry E. Ribstein, Cross-Listing and Regulatory
Competition, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 7 (2005); Peter Hostak et al., An Examination of the
Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Attractiveness of U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign
Firms
(Apr.
30,
2007)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=956020; Eric J. Pan, Why the World No Longer Puts its Stock in
Us (forthcoming, Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies,
Working Paper No. 176, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951705.
204. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., COMPETITIVE POSITION REP., supra note 203;
Brummer, supra note 203; Choi, supra note 203; Coffee, supra note 203; Cox, supra
note 203; Davidoff, supra note 203; Litvak, supra note 203; Ribstein, supra note 203.
205. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at 151 (discussing the lobbying of the
investment banks for the creation of the CSE program because of concerns about the
EU Conglomerates Directive); see also SEC IG’S CSE REPORT, supra note 70, at 4
(discussing the creation of the CSE program as a result of the EU Conglomerates
Directive); id. at 19–20 (noting that the SEC had not imposed a leverage limit on the
CSEs unlike the banking regulators who had imposed leverage limits on banks).
206. UK TREASURY FINANCIAL SERVICES REPORT, supra note 203, at 8.
207. DAVID KYNASTON, THE CITY OF LONDON, VOLUME IV: A CITY NO MORE 1945–
2000, at 735, 782–83 (2001).
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portions of Lehman Brothers following its financial collapse in
208
September 2008 was the only major deviation from this trend.
Thus, if Congress or the U.S. regulatory agencies truly wanted to
decrease regulatory arbitrage, they would need to focus both on
domestic regulatory arbitrage and on international regulatory
arbitrage.
Addressing international regulatory arbitrage would require new
international agreements, not just domestic legislation. International
209
agreements, like Basel II Capital Accord, are helpful because they
attempt to harmonize the regulatory requirements across countries
and thus reduce the ability of firms to play national regulators off
each other and reduce the incentives for firms to switch regulators.
Several international forums already exist to promote financial
regulatory harmonization. Among the major ones in the areas of
banking, insurance, and securities are the Basel Committee on
210
Banking Supervision, which focuses on banking regulations, the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), which
211
focuses on insurance,
and the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which focuses on securities
212
regulation. These organizations are international standards-setting
bodies. The agreements that they have produced are considered
213
“soft law” because the standards that they set are nonbinding.
Nevertheless, these organizations have helped push the national
standards of their member countries towards a uniform set of
standards in the areas of banking, insurance, and securities.

208. Press Release, Lehman Brothers, Barclays to Acquire Lehman Brothers’
Businesses and Assets (Sept. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2008/0916_barclays_acquisition.pdf.
209. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS—A REVISED FRAMEWORK 7 n. 5 (June 2004).
210. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, About the Basel Committee, http://bis.org/bcbs/
(last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
211. INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, http://iaisweb.org (last visited Mar. 10,
2011).
212. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, General Information,
http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
213. See Kern Alexander, Global Financial Standard Setting, the G10 Committees, and
International Economic Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 861, 869, 877 (2009) (discussing the
Basel Committee’s use of soft law and use of standards by IAIS and IOSCO);
Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of International Norms for Insurance Regulation, 34
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 953, 963–70 (2009) (discussing IAIS standards); Henry Deeb
Gabriel, The Advantages of Soft Law in International Commercial Law: The Role of
UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, and the Hague Conference, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 655, 658–60
(2009) (definition of soft law); Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of
Soft Law in Securities Regulations, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 898–900 (2009) (discussing
IOSCO’s use of standards and recommendations).
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E. Failure to Adequately Address the “Too Big to Fail” Problem
In recent decades, a large number of mergers and acquisitions
were taking place within the financial services industry. As a result,
the assets in each of the major sectors—banking, securities, and
insurance—became concentrated within fewer firms. This trend
began in the 1990s and accelerated after the enactment of GLBA and
the adoption of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
214
Efficiency Act of 1994, which eliminated the barriers to interstate
banking. Table 3 chronicles the hundreds of financial sector mergers
worth almost $1.7 trillion during the decade prior to the financial
crisis. Such mergers allow BHCs to be more diversified both
215
geographically and across economic sectors.
Regulators thought
that this would be advantageous as it tended to make them less
216
vulnerable to regional or sectoral slumps. They tended, however, to
ignore or underestimate the potential downsides of such growth.

Total value of
mergers ($ billions)

Total no.
of mergers

Table 3: Number and Value of Announced Financial Mergers and
217
Acquisitions
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

1178

988

913

820

765

875

865

971

1036

938

148.5

223.6

144.5

59.0

163.3

171.5

159.4

204.2

207.2

186.5

214. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1997)).
215. Dean Foust, Commentary: If This Safety Net Snaps, Who Pays?, BUS. WK., Apr. 27,
1998, http://www.businessweek.com/1998/17/b3575005.htm.
216. Id.
217. INS. INFO. INST., THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2005, at 3 (2005); INS.
INFO. INST., THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2010, at 3 (2010).
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One of those downsides was the growing belief among large
financial firms and their creditors that national politicians would not
allow the firms to fail because the politicians and regulators would
218
deem the economic and politic costs of doing so to be too great.
This phenomenon is called the “too big to fail” problem. The
phrase, “too big to fail,” should not be taken literally because it does
not refer only to extremely large banks. “Too big to fail” also covers
firms that may not be very large, but are so highly intertwined with
other financial institutions that their failure would start a cascade of
failures throughout the financial system that would be catastrophic
219
for the economy.
What are some of the potential costs of allowing “too big to fail”
institutions to go bankrupt? They include the failure of other banks
and financial institutions, a seizing up of the basic functions of the
220
financial system, and a decline in the economy.
On the other hand, not allowing large or highly interconnected
firms to fail creates a moral hazard problem as creditors no longer
feel the need to adequately monitor and assess the risks posed by
221
such financial firms. If creditors properly evaluated the risks posed
by such institutions, they would charge them higher prices as the
222
firms’ activities become riskier.
Because the creditors fail to
properly monitor firms that they believe are too big to fail, those
firms receive the wrong price and quantity signals, which in turn
leads them to engage in excessive risk-taking and a misallocation of
223
resources.
Being considered too big to fail, thus, is beneficial for
firms because it lowers the firm’s cost of capital, which raises its
profits or reduces its losses.
In light of this, it is not surprising that one of the motivations
posited for the large number of mergers in the 1990s was that banks
were actively seeking to become too big to fail. When looking solely
at the information embedded in share prices, the evidence that this

218. GARY H. STERN & RON FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
BAILOUTS 1–2, 12–17 (2004). “‘We have created financial institutions that are too big
to fail,’ says Henry Kaufman, the former Salomon Brothers economist known as ‘Dr.
Doom’ for saying things the Street doesn’t like to hear. ‘They are not submitted to
the full discipline of the marketplace,’ he adds.” Michelle Celarier, The God That
Failed, INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIGEST, Sept. 9, 2002, at 26.
219. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 218, at 16.
220. Id. at 12–13.
221. Id. at 17.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 17–18.
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was, in fact, a motivation for bank mergers was mixed.
When
looking at bond prices, however, evidence was found that the desire
225
to become too big to fail was a motivating factor. Research on the
relationship between bank mergers and bond prices from 2001
illustrated that medium-size banks (those with between $30 billion
and $100 billion in assets) experienced significant bond returns and
realized reductions in costs of funds following announcements that
they intended to merge with another bank, particularly when the
merger would result in the combined bank’s assets exceeding $100
226
billion.
On the other hand, this research also showed that megabanks (those that can be considered already too big to fail at the time
of the merger) and smaller banks (combined mean asset size of $30
billion or less) earned less return than bondholders of medium-size
227
banks.
In the case of commercial banks, the “too big to fail” belief was
created by the federal assistance given to Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Company, which was the seventh-largest
228
U.S. bank at the time when it failed in 1984. In order to stop a run
on Continental Illinois, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OCC
agreed that they would put together a package that included a $2
billion capital infusion, of which $1.5 billion came from the FDIC
and the remaining $500 million from a group of commercial banks
organized by the FDIC, a promise by the Federal Reserve that it
would meet Continental Illinois’s liquidity needs, and a promise by
the FDIC to ignore its $100,000 cap on deposit insurance and to

224. See George J. Benston, William C. Hunter & Larry D. Wall, Motivations for
Bank Mergers and Acquisitions: Enhancing the Deposit Insurance Put Option versus Earnings
Diversification, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 777, 778 (1995) (finding that acquirers
would not pay more for riskier banks whose returns are correlated with the acquirer’s
returns in order to become too big to fail as opposed to banks that offered earnings
diversification); Gayle L. DeLong, Stockholder Gains From Focusing versus Diversifying
Bank Mergers, 59 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 226, 250 (2001) (reporting no significant
relationship between combined bank size and abnormal equity returns realized at
the time of the merger announcement for bank mergers occurring in the period
from 1988 to 1995); Edward J. Kane, Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives
Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?, 32 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 671,
673 (2000) (arguing that evidence showing a positive correlation between equity
returns of acquirer and the size of its target supports the view that one motive for
bank mergers is to become too big to fail).
225. Maria Fabiana Penas & Haluk Unal, Gains in Bank Mergers: Evidence from the
Bond Markets, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 149, 150–51 (2004).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 218, at 13; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF
THE EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE vol. 1, 235–36 (1997), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf.
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protect all of Continental Illinois’s deposits.
In addition, the
federal regulators tried to find a merger partner for Continental
Illinois but when those efforts failed, they put the bank into a unique
resolution process, which included the FDIC buying $4.5 billion in
bad loans from the bank and acquiring $1 billion in preferred stock
in Continental Illinois’s holding company, Continental Illinois
230
Corporation. The FDIC required the holding company to give the
$1 billion that it had received in exchange for the stock, to
231
Continental Illinois.
Effectively, through this resolution process,
the federal government had acquired an 80% ownership interest in
232
the firm.
The assistance provided to Long Term Capital Management
(“LTCM”) extended the pool of firms deemed to be “too big to fail”
beyond banking to any financial service firm that was considered too
large or too interconnected with other firms to be allowed to go
233
bankrupt.
Such interconnectedness might cause a ripple effect
throughout the financial system, which would force other firms to
collapse. LTCM was a hedge fund that initially specialized in highvolume arbitrage trades in bond and bond-derivatives markets, but
234
eventually began to engage in other markets and in speculation. By
the end of 1997, LTCM had developed an impressive track record
235
with an average annual rate of return of approximately 40%.
LTCM’s assets had grown to $120 billion and its capital had grown to
about $7.3 billion by 1997, making it one of the largest hedge funds
236
in the United States.
When the financial markets deteriorated in the summer of 1998,
LTCM suffered substantial losses, which led to a 33% decline in the
firm’s assets to $80 billion and a 92% decline in the firm’s capital to
237
$600 million by September 19, 1998.
Amidst growing concerns about the likely failure of LTCM, the
Federal Reserve arranged for fourteen banks, which were also major
creditors of LTCM, to provide LTCM with a rescue package that
allowed shareholders to retain a 10% holding in LTCM, which was

229. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE,
supra note 228, at 243–44.
230. Id. at 244.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 247–48.
233. DOWD, supra note 28, at 2.
234. Id. at 3.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 3–4.
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valued at $400 million, while the consortium invested an additional
$3.65 billion in equity capital in LTCM in exchange for 90% of the
238
firm’s equity.
The bailout of LTCM was without precedent as the Federal Reserve
had no authority to regulate hedge funds. Hedge funds at that time
239
did not have a functional regulator.
The SEC could not regulate
LTCM because it fit within exemptions from regulation under the
240
241
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
242
the Investment Company Act of 1940 for hedge funds with fewer
243
In fact, the majority of U.S. hedge funds
than 100 shareholders.
restricted the number of their shareholders to fewer than 100 to
244
avoid being regulated.
In addition, no other federal agency had
245
the authority to regulate hedge funds.
The LTCM rescue created the perception that the Federal Reserve
has assumed responsibility for bailing out all large financial firms
when they got themselves into financial difficulties, even when the
246
Federal Reserve lacked any statutory authority to do so.
This
position allowed large financial conglomerates to take huge risks that
247
the Federal Reserve and other regulators could do little to prevent.
This perception that the Federal Reserve would bail out financially
troubled institutions was not affected by the refusal of the Federal
Reserve to intervene to save Enron in 2001. Why did the failure of
the Federal Reserve to help Enron not lower market expectations
regarding future government bailouts? This question is relevant
because, from the viewpoint of some commentators, Enron’s failure
posed a greater risk to the economy than LTCM’s failure would
248
have. Frank Partnoy testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Government Affairs that “Enron makes Long-Term Capital
Management look like a lemonade stand” because Enron made more
238. Id. at 4–5.
239. Id. at 2–3.
240. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
241. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
242. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2006).
243. DOWD, supra note 28, at 2–3.
244. Id. at 3.
245. See JOHN HUNT, HEDGE FUND REGULATION: THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP
COMMITTEES’ BEST PRACTICE REPORTS—RAISING THE BAR BUT MISSING RISKS 4–6
(Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy, June 2008) (discussing history
of proposed hedge fund regulations since LTCM and the lack of new mandatory
regulations prior to 2008); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds:
The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 979–90
(2006) (discussing the SEC as the sole regulator of hedge funds).
246. DOWD, supra note 28, at 3.
247. Id.
248. Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 2–3.
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money trading derivatives in 2000 than LTCM made during its
existence, Enron had 100 times as many employees as LTCM (Enron
had 20,000 while LTCM had only 200), and Enron lost over $70
billion in shareholders’ equity plus billions in funds owed to creditors
249
while LTCM only lost $4.6 billion.
Given those metrics, if the Federal Reserve felt justified in
intervening to save LTCM, why did it reach a different conclusion
with Enron? The answer probably rests on four factors. First, Enron
250
was not primarily viewed as a financial firm, unlike LTCM. Enron
had started out as an energy company when it was created in 1985,
and, while its derivatives business was extremely large, Enron still
251
earned over 90% of its total revenues from other sources in 2000.
Second, each of the fourteen financial firms that interceded to save
LTCM had large exposures because they had lent sizable sums to
252
LTCM that they stood to lose if LTCM went under. The major U.S.
and European financial firms did not have the same exposures to
Enron and, thus, would not have suffered the same level of losses if
253
Enron failed.
Third, by the time Enron sought federal aid in October of 2001, its
assets and derivatives position were nowhere near what they had been
254
at the end of 2000. By the end of its third quarter of 2001, Enron’s
derivatives position equaled only $19 billion, roughly one-fifth of the
255
As a result, federal
$1 trillion derivatives book that LTCM had.
regulators probably concluded that Enron’s collapse did not pose the
same threat that LTCM’s potential collapse had posed.
Fourth, Enron’s headquarters was located in Houston, not New
York, which meant that Enron did not have the access to cultivate the
same types of cozy relationships with the Federal Reserve that LTCM
256
had.
Kenneth Lay, the Chairman of Enron, had certainly sought
help from both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department to
secure Enron the same treatment that LTCM had received, but to no
257
avail.
249. Id.
250. BRYCE, supra note 23, at 324–26.
251. Id. at 241; Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 2.
252. BRYCE, supra note 23, at 325.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. From February 2000 to January 2002, Jeff Skilling, Enron’s CEO, was on
the Houston branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Id. at 324.
257. Id. at 324–26. Lay had spoken with Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve
Chairman, and Paul O’Neill, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, but neither apparently
were willing to come to Enron’s aid. Id.
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The significant differences between Enron and LTCM probably
enabled at least some market participants to write off Enron as an
aberration. Thus, they continued to believe that firms that were
generally viewed by the financial markets as “too big to fail” would be
bailed out by the federal government. This belief was confirmed
when the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury engineered J.P.
Morgan Chase’s acquisition of Bear Stearns for $2 per share in March
258
of 2008. As a result, the financial markets expected that the federal
government would provide assistance to any financial conglomerate
that was at least as large as Bear Stearns, which was the fifth-largest
259
investment banking conglomerate in the United States.
The upending of those expectations when the federal government
allowed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the second largest
investment banking conglomerate in the United States, contributed
260
to the panic in the financial markets. Ultimately, Lehman Brothers
was the only large U.S. financial conglomerate that was allowed to
fail. For all of the others, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve either
provided bailout funds or assisted in arranging a merger of the
struggling firm with a healthier firm. Consequently, the financial
crisis has solidified the proposition that the federal government
would rescue “too big to fail” financial firms for financial markets and
in the minds of the public.
F.

These Problems Were Foreseen

All of these problems could have been and, in many cases, were
foreseen well in advance of the recent financial crisis. The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission listed as its first conclusion that the

258. MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 182, at 347–48.
259. See id. at 349–51, 357, 359; ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 6, 239–44
(2009).
260. FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at xxi. Prior to Lehman Brothers’ collapse,
major market participants, like J.P. Morgan Chase, held some expectation that the
federal government might arrange a rescue package for Lehman Brothers like the
one that they had provided for LTCM. See SORKIN, supra note 259, at 242–43
(discussing telephone conversations between Steven Black of J.P. Morgan Chase and
Richard Fuld of Lehman Brothers concerning federal aid for Lehman Brothers).
Barclays and Bank of America specifically asked for government assistance as a
condition for them to go forward with an acquisition of Lehman Brothers. Id. at
278–79. Treasury Secretary Paulson, however, was not willing to provide federal
government funds to bail out Lehman Brothers in the same manner that the federal
government had bailed out Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac because the
political backlash that had erupted over the bailouts for the GSEs. Id. at 282–83. In
the end, Lehman Brothers was unable to arrange a merger with either Barclays or
Bank of America and filed for bankruptcy. The financial markets reacted with panic.
Id. at 390, 393–94.
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financial crisis was “avoidable” because there were “warning signs.”
These warning signs included the excessive risks that financial firms
had undertaken such as the “explosion in risky subprime lending and
securitization,” “egregious and predatory lending practices,” and the
“exponential growth in financial firms’ trading activities, unregulated
262
derivatives, and short-term ‘repo’ lending markets.”
Most of the
major financial conglomerates had engaged in all of these
263
practices.
Not only were there signs of danger, but government officials and
academics had warned about these problems well before the crisis
broke. For instance, the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) published reports for more than a decade warning about the
need for regulatory reform to deal with systemic risks posed by
financial conglomerates, inconsistent financial regulations, regulatory
arbitrage, a lack of coordination among regulators, and other
264
problems that contributed to the crisis.
Another example is Gary
H. Stern, then the president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minnesota, and Ron Feldman, then a vice-president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minnesota, who in 2004 published, Too Big to Fail:
The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, in which they discussed the hazards
posed to the financial system of creditors’ expectations that large
265
financial firms would be bailed out by the federal government.
Paul Volcker, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1979
to 1987, wrote the foreword to this book and noted that:
The broader concern is the perceived sense of growing “moral
hazard,” specifically the possibility that confident expectations of
creditor “bailouts” will dull normal market discipline. Inherently, a
protected creditor will have less incentive for “due diligence,” with

261. FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at xvii.
262. Id.
263. Id. at xvii, xix–xx, 31–32, 68–71, 150–51.
264. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-214, BANKS’ SECURITIES
ACTIVITIES: OVERSIGHT DIFFERS DEPENDING ON ACTIVITY AND REGULATOR 4–5 (1995)
(noting different levels of oversight, weak enforcement by Federal Reserve for
noncompliance of firewall protections between securities and banking, and lack of
training for FDIC examiners dealing with securities subsidiaries); GAO FINANCIAL
REGULATION, supra note 147, at 8, 10 (discussing problems with sharing of
information and coordinating regulatory responses among multiple agencies,
regulatory arbitrage, and the dangers posed by systemic risks); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-32, FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY TRENDS
CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 26 (2007) (reiterating
some of the findings of the 2004 report and noting the problems posed by the
federal agencies handled consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates).
265. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 218, at 60–79.
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the perverse result of encouraging excessive risk-taking and failure
266
itself.

As noted above, scholars found evidence in the bond markets of
creditors’ expectations that large financial institutions would be
267
bailed out by the federal government.
The reason that they were
not dealt with was not a lack of imagination but a lack of political will
and pressure from the financial services to preserve the regulatory
268
status from which they profited immensely.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT
The Dodd-Frank Act took three steps to address the problems
posed by financial conglomerates. First, it reduced the ability of
financial conglomerates to engage in regulatory arbitrage and
provided mechanisms to ensure that systemically important financial
conglomerates are regulated by the Federal Reserve. Second, it
improved supervision of financial conglomerates by, among other
things, establishing uniform capital adequacy standards for financial
conglomerates. Third, it took some steps to minimize the “too big to
fail” problem. Each one of these actions will be addressed in more
detail below.
A. Reduced Ability of Financial Conglomerates to Pick Their Regulator
The Dodd-Frank Act reduced the ability of financial conglomerates
to pick their regulator by making it extremely unlikely that
financial conglomerates, at least systemically important financial
conglomerates, would be regulated on a consolidated basis by any
agency other than the Federal Reserve. It accomplishes this by taking
four actions.
1.

Eliminating the OTS as a holding company regulator
The Enhancing Financial Institution Safety and Soundness Act of
2010, which comprises Title III of the Dodd-Frank Act, transfers all of
the power of the OTS to regulate thrifts to OCC and transfers all of
the power of the OTS to regulate thrift holding companies to the

266. Paul A. Volcker, Foreword to STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 218, at ix.
267. Penas & Unal, supra note 225, at 150–51.
268. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at xviii, 41–42, 55 (stating that between 1999
and 2008 the financial sector spent over $2.7 billion on lobbying); MCLEAN &
NOCERA, supra note 182, at 40–42, 63–68, 174–76 (discussing the amount of lobbying
done by the GSEs and the firms trading derivatives to prevent stricter regulation of
their activities).
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Federal Reserve. This transfer is to be completed within one year of
the date of the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, unless the Treasury
Secretary, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the OTS,
the FDIC Chairperson, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
270
Board of Governors all agree to an extension.
Any extension is
271
limited to an additional six months.
In other words, this transfer
must take place by July 21, 2011, unless an extension is granted and if
272
This
an extension is granted, by no later than January 21, 2012.
action addresses the way some investment banks and other financial
firms, like Merrill Lynch and AIG, avoided being regulated by the
Federal Reserve as FHCs or BHCs while still being able to offer
banking products by acquiring a thrift. Closing down the OTS
effectively kills that option.
2.

Eliminating the SEC as a holding company regulator
The Dodd-Frank Act ends any remaining authority of the SEC to
regulate financial conglomerates as holding companies. It does this
by eliminating the ability of investment banking holding companies
to voluntarily select the SEC to regulate them on a consolidated basis
and by requiring securities holding companies to be regulated by the
273
Federal Reserve. This change is not as significant as the closing of

269. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521–22 (2010)
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412).
270. Id. § 311, at 1520–21 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5411).
271. Id.
272. The Dodd-Frank Act was signed by the President and became law on July 21,
2010. H.R. 4173: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4173 (last visited
Apr. 7, 2011) (tracking legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act).
273. Dodd-Frank Act § 617, 124 Stat. 1616 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q)
(eliminating 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i) and giving the Federal Reserve the power to regulate
securities holding companies). A “securities holding company” is defined in the
statute as:
(i) a person (other than a natural person) that owns or controls 1 or
more brokers or dealers registered with the Commission; and
(ii) the associated persons of a person described in clause (i); and
(B) does not include a person that is—
(i) a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board under title I;
(ii) an insured bank (other than an institution described in
subparagraphs (D), (F), or (H) of section 2(c)(2) of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(c)(2)) or a savings association;
(iii) an affiliate of an insured bank (other than an institution described
in subparagraphs (D), (F), or (H) of section 2(c)(2) of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(c)(2)) or an affiliate of a savings
association;
(iv) a foreign bank, foreign company, or company that is described in
section 8(a) of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3106(a));

BROWN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS

5/17/2011 6:48 PM

1391

the OTS and the transferring of its powers to the Federal Reserve and
the OCC. The SEC had ended its CSE program on September 26,
2008 after the SEC’s Inspector General released a report
documenting how the program had contributed to the financial
274
difficulties of Bear Stearns.
At that time, all of the investment
banking conglomerates that the SEC had regulated had either been
acquired by FHCs regulated by the Federal Reserve (Bear Stearns and
Merrill Lynch), collapsed (Lehman Brothers), or had voluntarily
subjected themselves to the regulatory authority of the Federal
Reserve by beginning the process to become FHCs (Goldman Sachs
275
and Morgan Stanley).
Section 617 of the Dodd-Frank Act merely
prevents the SEC from ever resurrecting its CSE program or creating
any similar program in the future.
3.

Preventing certain BHCs from evading regulation by the Federal Reserve
The Dodd-Frank Act prevents any financial conglomerate that
became a FHC or BHC and received TARP funds from avoiding
regulation by the Federal Reserve by spinning off or changing the
276
charter of any banking subsidiary. The summary of the Act released
by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
nicknames this provision the “Hotel California” provision, which
seems to refer to the last lines of the title song of the Eagles’ Hotel
California album (“You can check out any time you like, but you can
never leave”), but other commentators have referred to it as the
“roach motel” provision because you can check in, but you can’t
277
check out.
(v) a foreign bank that controls, directly or indirectly, a corporation
chartered under section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 611 et
seq.); or
(vi) subject to comprehensive consolidated supervision by a foreign
regulator.
Id. § 618(a)(4), at 1617 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1850a).
274. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox
Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entity Program (Sept. 26, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm.
275. Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman Totters, Merrill is Sold,
AIG Seeks to Raise Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at A1; Robert Schroeder, Goldman,
Morgan to Become Holding Companies, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 21, 2008),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/goldman-sachs-morgan-stanley-to-become-bankholding-companies; Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas Jr., JPMorgan Acts to Buy
Ailing Bear Stearns at Huge Discount, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/business/16cndbear.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=JP%20morgan%20to%20acquire%20bear%20stearns%20
2008&st=cse.
276. Dodd-Frank Act § 617, 124 Stat. 1616 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q).
277. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 111ST CONG., BRIEF
SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT,
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This provision applies to any BHC or FHC that had more than $50
billion in total consolidated assets on January 1, 2010 and received
278
any funds under the TARP program and any successor entity.
If
such a BHC or FHC divests itself of its bank, changes its charter to
that of another depository institution that is not subject to the Bank
Holding Company Act, or ceases to be a BHC by any other means, it
would continue to be subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve as
279
a “nonbank financial company.”
The Act defines a “nonbank financial company” as a company that
280
is “predominantly engaged in financial activities.” Under the Act, a
firm will be deemed to be “predominantly engaged in financial
activities” if 85% of its gross revenues on a consolidated basis or 85%
of its total assets on a consolidated basis are derived from “financial
281
activities” as that term is defined in subsection 4(k) of the BHCA.
The Act does not specify during what time period that company must
available
at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform
_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf; Edmund L. Andrews, Financial Regulation—Not
as Ugly as it Looks, CAPITALGAINSANDGAMES (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://www.capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/edmund-l-andrews/1579/financialregulation-not-ugly-it-looks; THE EAGLES, Hotel California, on HOTEL CALIFORNIA
(Elektra Entertainment 1976).
278. Dodd-Frank Act § 117(a), 124 Stat. 1406–07 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
5327).
279. Id. § 117(b), at 1407 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5327). The term,
“nonbank financial company,” is defined as any foreign company that would not be
classified as a BHC and that is “predominantly” engaged in any financial activities
within the United States and any U.S. company that would not be classified as a BHC
or Farm Credit System institution, national securities exchange, clearing agency,
security-based swap execution facility, or security-based swap data repository
registered with the SEC, board of trade designated as a contract market, a derivatives
clearing organization, swap execution facility or a swap data repository registered
with the CFTC, or any parents of such entities, except in certain circumstances when
the parent is a BHC, and that is “predominantly engaged in financial activities.” Id. §
102(a)(4), at 1391 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5311).
280. Id. § 102(a)(6), at 1391–92 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5311).
281. Id. Section 4(k) of BHCA states:
(k) Engaging in activities that are financial in nature
(1) In General
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a financial holding company
may engage in any activity, and may acquire and retain the shares of any
company engaged in any activity, that the [Federal Reserve] Board, in
accordance with paragraph (2), determines (by regulation or order)—
(A) to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity; or
(B) is complementary to a financial activity and does not pose a
substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or
the financial system generally.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2006). Section (k)(4) of the BHCA also provides an
extensive laundry list of activities that the act considers to be “financial in nature.”
Id. § 1843(k)(4). These activities encompass all of the activities generally associated
with the banking, securities, and insurance businesses.
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possess this level of gross revenues or total assets from financial
activities. The Federal Reserve issued a proposed rulemaking in
February that would make the determination of how much of a
company’s gross revenues or total assets came from financial activities
based on the data available in the most recent two years of the
282
company’s consolidated financial statements.
The Financial Stability Oversight Counsel (FSOC), an interagency
body created by the Dodd-Frank Act to promote financial stability,
normally must approve classifying an entity as a nonbank financial
283
company subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve. This FSOC
approval, however, would not be required to classify any of the firms
covered by the Hotel California provision as a nonbank financial
company subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve if it ceases to
284
be a BHC or FHC.
Only thirty-six FHCs and BHCs had more than $50 billion in total
285
assets on December 31, 2010.
Of these holding companies, only
twenty-four of them accepted TARP funds through the Capital
286
Purchase Program.
Thus, only those twenty-four firms and their
successors will be subject to the Hotel California provision.
The differences in the amount of total assets of each of the firms
subject to the Hotel California provision is rather wide, with the
largest firm controlling more than forty-four times the total assets

282. Definitions of “Predominantly Engaged in Financial Activities” and
“Significant” Nonbank Financial Company and Bank Holding Company, 76 Fed.
Reg. 7731 (proposed Feb. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 255).
283. See Dodd-Frank Act § 113, 124 Stat. 1398 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323)
(imposing only Federal Reserve supervision on nonbank financial companies after at
least a two-thirds vote of the members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council).
284. Id. § 113(d), at 1401 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323(d)).
285. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, TOP 50 BHCS,
http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx (last visited Mar. 25,
2011) [hereinafter TOP 50 BHCS].
286. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TARP TRANSACTION REPORT (Mar. 24, 2011),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/briefingroom/reports/tarp-transactions/Pages/default.aspx (click on hyperlink dated
March 24, 2011) [hereinafter TARP TRANSACTION REPORT]; PROPUBLICA, BAILOUT
RECIPIENTS, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list/index (last visited Mar. 26,
2011). The eight firms from the top BHCs that did not accept any TARP funds
include Taunus Corporation, HSBC North America Holdings Inc., TD Bank US
Holding Company, Citizens Financial Group, Inc., UnionBanCal Corporation,
BancWest Corporation, Harris Financial Corp., and BBVA USA Bancshares, Inc.
TARP TRANSACTION REPORT, supra; TOP 50 BHCS, supra note 285. Ally Financial Inc.,
formerly known as GMAC Inc, accepted $16.29 billion in TARP funds under the
Automotive Industry Financing Program, not the Capital Purchase Program. TARP
TRANSACTION REPORT, supra; TOP 50 BHCS, supra note 285; Press Release, Ally
Financial Inc., Ally Financial Statement on New Corporate Brand (May 10, 2010),
available at http://media.ally.com/index.php?s=43&item=401.
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287

controlled by the smallest firm in the group.
Bank of America
Corporation has the largest amount with approximately $2.3 trillion
worth of total assets, while Marshall & Ilsley Corporation has the
288
smallest with only $50.2 billion worth of total assets.
The Hotel California provision seems to have been drafted with
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and American Express in mind. All
289
of those firms converted to BHCs during the financial crisis.
Goldman Sachs’s actions illustrate the concerns behind this
provision. Goldman Sachs avoided being subject to regulation by the
Federal Reserve by owning an industrial loan company and a foreign
bank, both of which are exempt from the definition of “bank” in the
Bank Holding Company Act and thus, Goldman Sachs was not
classified as a BHC subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve under
290
that Act.
Goldman Sachs only became a BHC in September 2008
when financial firms were facing liquidity crises in the wake of
Lehman’s collapse, and having greater access to the Federal Reserve’s
lending facilities, particularly its discount window, was deemed highly
291
desirable.
In order to become a BHC, Goldman Sachs had to
become an owner of a bank and it did so by merging its industrial
loan company with Goldman Sachs Trust Company and converting
the charter of the resulting firm into a New York state-chartered
292
bank.
In addition, as a BHC, Goldman Sachs received $10 billion
in TARP funds, which also helped ease any financial problems that it
293
was facing in the depths of the crisis.
A little over a year later,
287. See TOP 50 BHCS, supra note 285 (listing total assets of largest BHCs).
288. Id.
289. Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and American Express all became BHCs in
order to access government assistance programs. Eric Dash, American Express Becomes
a Bank Holding Company, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/11/business/worldbusiness/11ihtamex.4.17725805.html; Schroeder, supra note 275.
290. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2) (2006); Goldman Sachs, Annual Report, (Form 10K), at Ex. 21.1 (2007), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ourfirm/investors/financials/archived/10k/docs/2007-form-10-k-file.pdf; Goldman Sachs
Gets its N.Y. Banking License, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/business/29bizbriefsGOLDMAN_BRF.html?dbk.
291. Ben White, Starting a New Era at Goldman and Morgan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23wall.html?scp=9&sq=Goldman+S
achs+to+become+bank+holding+company&st=nyt.
292. Goldman Sachs Gets its N.Y. Banking License, supra note 290.
293. Joe Nocera, Short Memories at Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at B1, B5.
Goldman also took advantage of other government programs to help out distressed
financial firms, including the FDIC’s commercial paper guarantee program, the
repayment of 100 cents on the dollar to all of AIG’s counterparties including
Goldman Sachs, and the Term-Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility, which allowed
participating financial firms to buy distressed securities and sell them at a profit. Id.

BROWN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS

5/17/2011 6:48 PM

1395

Goldman Sachs was claiming that it had not needed the TARP funds
and that it resented the strings that seemed to have come attached
with taking that money in terms of the criticisms that it endured for
294
setting aside $5.3 billion to pay out year-end bonuses in 2009.
These actions created the impression in some quarters that Goldman
Sachs would reorganize itself to cease to be a BHC under the Federal
Reserve’s supervision as soon as the economy recovered and it
295
determined that it no longer needed the government’s assistance.
Section 117 would prevent this type of regulatory arbitrage by
requiring Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, American Express and
other similar large firms that took advantage of government
assistance programs in troubled economic times by reorganizing
themselves as BHCs to continue to be regulated by the Federal
Reserve even if they cease to be bank holding companies at some
296
point in the future.
4. Forcing certain nonbank financial companies to be supervised by the
Federal Reserve
As mentioned above, the Dodd-Frank Act gives the FSOC the
power to classify any entity that is not already a FHC, a BHC, or a
THC subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve as a nonbank
297
In order to
financial company supervised by the Federal Reserve.
classify a firm as a nonbank financial company supervised by the
Federal Reserve, two-thirds of the voting members then serving on
the FSOC must conclude that it warrants such supervision because
the firm is a nonbank financial company and that its “material
financial distress” or “the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities” of the company “could
298
pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.” To help
the FSOC make this determination, the Dodd-Frank Act lists ten
factors that they should consider as well as concluding that they may

294. Id.
295. Courtney Comstock, Senator Corker Says He Made a Specific “Hotel California”
Provision in Dodd’s New Bill for Goldman Sachs, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 17, 2010),
http://www.businessinsider.com/corker-says-he-made-the-hotel-california-provisionin-dodds-new-bill-for-goldman-sachs-2010-3; Steve Eder & Karey Wutkowski, Goldman
Could Be a Bank, For Better or Worse, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/16/us-goldman-reform-analysisidUSTRE62F4TG20100316.
296. Dodd-Frank Act § 117, 124 Stat. 1406–07 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5327).
297. Id. § 113, at 1398 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §5323).
298. Id. § 113(a)(1), at 1398 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §5323).
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consider “any other risk-related factors” that they consider
299
appropriate.
As previously noted, nonbank financial companies are defined as
those whose gross revenues or total assets from financial activities
equal or exceed 85% of their total gross revenues or total assets from
300
all sources.
The Act recognizes that such a bright line rule could
lead to some firms attempting to avoid being classified as a nonbank
financial company by keeping either their total gross revenues or
total assets from financial activities under the 85% threshold. The
Act includes an antievasion provision which allows two-thirds of the
voting members of the FSOC to agree to place a financial company
under the supervision of the Federal Reserve even though that
company has organized itself in such a way as to fall outside the
definition of a nonbank financial company, provided that the
“material financial distress” of the company poses a threat to the
301
financial stability of the United States.
Berkshire Hathaway illustrates how a firm could change the mix of
the businesses in which its subsidiaries operate in order to fall outside
the definition of a nonbank financial company. Berkshire Hathaway
is not a BHC, a FHC, or a THC and so is not supervised by the
302
Federal Reserve.
In 2008 and 2009, more than 85% of its total
revenues came from financial activities, predominately its insurance
303
In 2009, just under 85% of its total assets were
subsidiaries.
304
associated with financial activities. Thus, if the Dodd-Frank Act had
been in existence in 2008 and 2009, Berkshire Hathaway would have
305
been classified as a nonbank financial company.
In 2010, Berkshire Hathaway acquired Burlington Northern Santa
306
Fe Corporation, a railroad company.
In the wake of that
acquisition, only about 80% of Berkshire Hathaway’s total revenues
came from financial activities and only roughly 69% of its total assets
299. Id. § 113(a)(2), at 1398 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §5323).
300. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
301. Dodd-Frank Act § 113(c), 124 Stat. 1399 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §5323).
302. Berkshire Hathaway does not own any banks or thrifts and thus, is not
required by law to be regulated by the Federal Reserve as a FHC, BHC, or THC. See
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2010 10-K Report, supra note 20, at Ex. 21 (listing all of
Berkshire Hathaway’s subsidiaries, which do not include any banks, thrifts, or
industrial loan companies).
303. Id. at 28.
304. Id. at 61.
305. See Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1392 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5311) (defining nonbank financial companies as companies whose gross revenues or
total assets from financial activities equal or exceed 85% of their total gross revenues
or total assets from all sources).
306. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2010 10-K Report, supra note 20, at 36.
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307

were associated with financial activities in 2010. Going forward, it is
unlikely that Berkshire Hathaway’s total revenues from financial
activities or total assets from financial activities will exceed the 85%
threshold set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act. If the antievasion
provision did not exist, any firm that did not want to be classified as a
nonbank financial company would simply acquire enough
nonfinancial subsidiaries so that its total revenues from financial
activities or total assets from financial activities fell below the
308
thresholds set forth in the Act.
If the FSOC does place a firm under the supervision of the Federal
Reserve, the Federal Reserve may only impose regulations on the
309
firm’s financial activities and not on its nonfinancial activities. For
example, if the FSOC decided that Berkshire Hathaway should be
subject to Federal Reserve supervision, the Federal Reserve could
only regulate the financial activities of Berkshire Hathaway and not its
railroad subsidiaries.
5.

Weaknesses of the reforms aimed at reducing regulatory arbitrage
a. Some current THCs might evade Federal Reserve supervision in the
future

The Hotel California provision only applies to companies that were
310
classified as BHCs and FHCs on January 1, 2010. It would not apply
to large THCs like AIG and Prudential Financial, two of the largest
311
financial conglomerates in the United States. If any THC decided it
no longer wanted to be supervised by the Federal Reserve, it could
convert any thrift it owned to an industrial loan company and thereby
cease to be a THC while still offering the same range of products and
312
services. Depending upon which state the industrial loan company
was chartered in, a THC that did this type of reorganization might
still be subject to supervision by a state regulator as an industrial loan

307. Id. at 28.
308. See, e.g., supra notes 302–307 and accompanying text (describing how
Berkshire Hathaway has lowered its financial activities so as to fall outside the
definition of a nonbank financial company).
309. Dodd-Frank Act, § 113(c)(6), 124 Stat. 1400–01 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5323).
310. Id. § 117, at 1406–07 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5327).
311. Id. (Hotel California provision only applies to BHCs, not THCs).
312. While the Hotel California provision only applies to BHCs and not THCs, the
Federal Reserve still will regulate THCs under the Dodd-Frank Act. See id. §§ 117,
301–19. As a result, a THC would have to get rid of its thrift or convert it into an
industrial loan company in order to escape being supervised by the Federal Reserve.
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holding company, but it would no longer be subject to supervision by
313
any federal holding company regulator.
Alternatively, a THC could sell its thrifts, which would also result in
it ceasing to be a THC, but it probably would no longer be able to
offer the full range of services that it had previously provided unless it
either owned or acquired a foreign bank, as holding companies for
foreign banks are not classified as BHCs or FHCs subject to
314
supervision by the Federal Reserve. If it acquired a foreign bank, it
would no longer be subject to supervision by any state or federal
holding company regulator. It might, however, become subject to
similar supervision by the relevant foreign financial services regulator
315
in the country that chartered the foreign bank that it acquired. For
example, if the company acquired a French bank, the EU Financial
Conglomerate Directive would require it to be supervised on a
consolidated basis by the French financial supervisor because it has
316
no U.S. financial supervisor fulfilling that function.
The Federal Reserve would have to convince the FSOC to classify
any THC that undertook such reorganizations as a nonbank financial
company subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve. In cases like
AIG, getting two-thirds of the FSOC voting members to agree to do
this probably would not be difficult because the federal government
had to provide $125 billion to AIG in order to bail it out during the
317
financial crisis.
The Federal Reserve probably would find it
significantly more difficult to persuade two-thirds of the FSOC voting
members that companies like Prudential Financial, which did not
receive any TARP funds, constitute a threat to the financial stability of
318
the United States.
b. The FSOC might find it difficult to agree on which firms pose a
threat to financial stability
Getting two-thirds of the voting members of the FSOC to agree to
require a firm to submit to Federal Reserve supervision may prove
313. See supra Part I.E (describing how state banking and financial institution
regulators also regulate holding companies).
314. Foreign banks are excluded from the definition of bank under the Bank
Holding Company Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(A) (2006).
315. Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 72, at Ch. II, Art. 18.
316. Id.
317. Jim Puzzanghera, AIG Makes $6.9-billion Repayment of TARP Bailout Funds, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/09/business/la-fi-aigtarp-20110309.
318. Prudential, Ameriprise Turn Down TARP, UPI.COM, May 16, 2009,
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/2009/05/16/Prudential-Ameriprise-turndown-TARP/UPI-80481242481550/.
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problematic. The FSOC is chaired by the Treasury Secretary and is
comprised of nine other voting members who are the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Director of the FDIC, the SEC Chairman, the CFTC
Chairman, the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), the Director of the FHFA, the Chairman of the
319
NCUA, and an insurance expert appointed by the president.
The
FSOC also has five nonvoting members, including the Director of the
Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”), the Director of Office of Financial
Research, and three representatives from the state financial
regulators with one of these representing each of the major sectors320
banking, securities, and insurance.
The members of the FSOC do not have a strong history of working
together. This is due in part to the fact that each of these agencies
321
has different regulatory objectives and constituencies.
Some of
these agencies have engaged in bitter turf wars in the past over who
322
had the right to regulate a particular product or firm. It is doubtful
that they will work smoothly together on the FSOC.
The experience of FFIEC illustrates this. FFIEC only has five
members, but how well those members cooperated with one another
has been highly dependent on the individuals representing each
323
agency at any given time. As a result, it suffered from cooperation
and coordination problems at various times in its history.
These types of problems are likely to be worse with the FSOC,
324
which has twice as many voting members as FFIEC. Various studies
on boards of directors have found that as the number of board

319. Dodd-Frank Act, § 111(b), 124 Stat. 1392 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321).
320. Id. § 111(b)(2), at 1393 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321).
321. See supra Part I (describing the varying objectives of the different
organizations before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act).
322. FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at 46–48, 152 (describing disputes between the
CFTC and the SEC and between the SEC and the OTS); Brown, supra note 6, at 52–
57, 64–65 (discussing agency turf wars between federal and state bank regulators and
between the SEC and CFTC).
323. OIG FFIEC REPORT, supra note 154, at 14–15 (discussing problems among the
banking regulators with creating uniform examination procedures and reports); id.
at 16–18 (discussing problems with expanding the number of agencies on FFIEC and
problems concerning coordination efforts between the banking agencies and the
SEC); GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 147, at 97–101.
324. Compare Dodd-Frank Act § 111(b), supra notes 319–320 and accompanying
text (listing the ten voting members of the FSOC and the five nonvoting members of
the FSOC), with OIG FFIEC REPORT, supra note 323 and accompanying text (noting
there were five members of the FFIEC).
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members increase, the coordination and cooperation problems
325
worsen.
c.

The Federal Reserve may prove to be a poor supervisor

While all of these actions eliminate regulatory arbitrage, that alone
is not sufficient to prevent a future financial crisis. Much will depend
on how well the Federal Reserve fulfills it roles as the primary
regulator of financial conglomerates. The jury is still out on whether
the Federal Reserve proved to be a substantially better supervisor of
financial institutions than the other regulators.
Before the crisis, the Federal Reserve was responsible for regulating
both very large financial conglomerates and very small state chartered
326
banks that were members of the Federal Reserve.
In 2006, before
the financial crisis began, the Federal Reserve supervised 901 statechartered member banks with average assets of $1.5 billion, 4,654
small BHCs with average assets of $203 million, and 448 large BHCs
327
with average assets of $27 billion, as well as 643 FHCs. These 6,646
institutions in 2006 represented a 5% decline from the 7,046
institutions, including 1,042 state-chartered member banks and 6,004
328
BHCs, supervised by the Federal Reserve a decade earlier in 1995.
The number of full-time employees of the Federal Reserve, however,
325. Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren & Martin T. Wells, Larger Board Size
and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 53 (1998) (finding that
larger boards in small firms led to lower firm performance due in part to problems
with communication and coordination); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuations of
Companies With a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 185–86 (1996) (finding
that the stock markets reward companies with small boards of directors with higher
stock valuation); Martin A. Lipton & Jay W. Losch, A Modest Proposal for Improved
Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAWYER 59, 70–72 (1992) (noting that boards with more
than ten members are slower to make decisions, and have less candid discussions).
But see Mohamed Belkhin, Board of Directors’ Size and Performance in the Banking
Industry, 5 INT’L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 201 (2009) (finding no negative relationship
associated with size of board and the firm’s performance); Kenneth M. Lehn,
Sukesh Patro & Mengxin Zhao, Determinates of the Size and Composition of US Corporate
Boards: 1935–2000, 38 FIN. MANAGEMENT 747, 748 (Winter 2009) (finding “no robust
relationship” between board size and firm performance); Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D.
Daniel & Lalitha Naveen, Boards: Does One Size Fit All, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 329, 351 (2008)
(concluding that certain types of firms benefit from larger boards).
326. U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 93D ANNUAL REPORT 65
(2006) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 2006], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/annual06/pdf/ar06.pdf;
U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 60 (9th ed. 2005), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf (shares regulatory authority
with the FDIC for state chartered member banks).
327. FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 326, at 65.
328. U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 82D ANNUAL REPORT 231
(1995) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 1995], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/ann95.pdf.
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declined 17% from a total of 22,457 full-time employees in 1995 to
329
Thus, the Federal Reserve’s
18,681 full-time employees in 2006.
resources to supervise financial firms shrank substantially more than
the number of firms it oversaw during the ten year period prior to
the financial crisis.
TARP and other actions have to some extent masked how many
financial conglomerates regulated by the Federal Reserve might have
failed because of poor supervision. The same is not true at the other
end of the scale. Smaller firms were not so lucky and hundreds of
330
them were allowed to fail.
The number of U.S. banks and thrifts
that have failed in this recent crisis is considerably smaller then the
number that failed during the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s and
1990s, as illustrated in Figure 4. Nevertheless, the amount of assets
controlled by the U.S. banks and thrifts that failed in 2008 was
greater than the amount of assets controlled by the U.S. banks and
thrifts that failed in any single year during the savings and loan crisis,
as also shown in Figure 4.

329. Id. at 293; FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 326, at 297.
330. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FAILURES AND ASSISTANCE TRANSACTIONS INTERACTIVE
DATABASE, SUMMARY REPORT OF YEARS 1970 TO 2010, available at
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30
(select “Effective Date”
range from “1970 to 2010” and “Report” type as “Summary”).
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Figure 4: Total Number of Failed U.S. Banks and Thrifts and Their Total
331
Assets: 1980–2010 (total assets in billions of constant 2009 U.S. dollars)
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With regard to these smaller institutions, the Federal Reserve
performed no better than the FDIC or the OCC when comparing the
number of banks under its supervision that failed or required
assistance from the FDIC with the total number of institutions under
its supervision, as illustrated in Figure 5. Only the OTS had a worse
track record.

331. Id.; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., STATISTICS AT A GLANCE, FDIC HISTORICAL
TRENDS—AS OF DEC. 31, 2010, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/index.html (under December 2010
Statistics, select “FDIC Historical Trends”); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI
INFLATION CALCULATOR, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (to convert
asset values into constant 2009 U.S. dollars).
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Figure 5: Number of Failed and Assisted Institutions by Regulator as a
Percentage of the Total Number of Institutions Supervised by That Regulator
332
in 2006
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B. Improved Supervision of Holding Companies
The Dodd-Frank Act did not just attempt to reduce regulatory
arbitrage by FHCs. It also took two actions to enhance supervision of
such companies.
1.

The Act established uniform minimum capital adequacy standards
The Dodd-Frank Act established one set of minimum capital
requirements for insured depository institutions, BHCs, and nonbank
333
financial companies subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve.
332. Assisted institutions does not refer to troubled financial institutions that
received TARP funds, but instead to institutions that were either acquired by another
institution with the assistance of the FDIC or were involved in open bank assistance
transactions in which the FDIC provided the troubled institution with funds to keep
it from failing. For a definition of “open bank assistance,” see FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 47 (2003), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/index.html (select Chapter 5).
For data in Figure 5, see FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FAILURES AND ASSISTANCE
TRANSACTIONS INTERACTIVE DATABASE, DETAILED SEARCH OF YEARS 2006 TO 2010,
available at http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 (select “Effective
Date” range from “2006 to 2010”, select “Report” type as “Detailed”, selected Charter
Type as “All Commercial & Savings”, and select Transaction Type as “All Transaction
Types”); FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 326, at 65, 127; OFFICE OF
THRIFT SUPERVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2006 FACT BOOK 5 (2006), available
at http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/2006FactBook.pdf. For purposes of this chart, the
FDIC-supervised institutions includes both failed and assisted banks and savings
banks as a percentage of all of the financial institutions supervised by the FDIC in
2006.
333. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 171(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1436 (2010)
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371).
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The minimum capital requirements include both generally
334
and the
applicable minimum leverage capital requirements
335
generally applicable risk-based capital requirements.
The DoddFrank Act states that the levels for these two requirements on July 21,
2010 serve as a floor and prohibits the Federal Reserve from reducing
336
these requirements below their levels on July 21, 2010.
The Act
allows the Federal Reserve to set higher amounts for both generally
applicable minimum leverage capital requirements and the generally
applicable risk-based capital requirements than the levels that they
were at on July 21, 2010.
The advantage of this requirement is that all holding companies
for financial services that are systemically important will be required
to meet the same, minimum capital adequacy requirements. As a
result, these holding companies will be on a level playing field in
terms of competition. As noted above, under the prior regulatory
regime, CSEs had a competitive advantage over FHCs and BHCs
because of the weaker capital requirements imposed on them by the
SEC than the requirements imposed on FHCs and BHCs by the
337
Federal Reserve.
In addition, if the Federal Reserve becomes
captured by the financial conglomerates that it supervises, this
measure will prevent those conglomerates from using their influence
over the Federal Reserve to undermine capital adequacy standards
completely because the Federal Reserve does not have complete
338
discretion on the required levels due to this provision in the Act.
Another effect of this provision is that the largest banks in the
United States will probably not be allowed to use their own internal
risk models that would allow them to operate with lower minimum
339
risk-based capital requirements than smaller banks.
The Federal
334. These are defined as “the minimum ratios of tier 1 capital to average total
assets” set by the federal banking regulators. Id. § 171(a)(1), at 1435 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 5371).
335. These are defined as the ratios based on “the regulatory capital components
in the numerator” and “the risk-weighted assets in the denominator.” Id.
§ 171(a)(2)(B), at 1436 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371).
336. Id. § 171(b), at 1436 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371). The Dodd-Frank
Act also contains some phase-in periods for certain debt and equity instruments and
for depository institution holding companies that were not regulated by the Federal
Reserve on May 19, 2010. Id. § 171(b)(4), at 1437 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5371).
337. SEC IG’S CSE REPORT, supra note 70, at 4, 19–20.
338. § 171(b), 124 Stat. 1436 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371).
339. The FDIC, OCC, and the Federal Reserve issued on Dec. 16, 2010 a joint
notice of proposed rulemaking to amend the advanced risk-based capital adequacy
standards under Basle II that they had approved in 2007 to eliminate the transitional
floors that would have allowed certain banks to use internal risk models to lower
their capital adequacy requirements. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL-88-2010, PROPOSED
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Reserve, the OCC, and the FDIC currently are considering adopting a
340
If such a rule is ultimately adopted, it will also
rule to that effect.
allow small banks to compete with larger banks on a more level
playing field in the future. As a result, banks and other financial
institutions may not feel pressured as much to merge as they would
have if the advanced risk-based capital adequacy standards that the
federal banking regulators originally adopted under Basel II were left
in place. Without this pressure, fewer financial institutions may join
the ranks of the “too big to fail” firms because they no longer think
that they must in order to remain competitive.
2. The Act gives the Federal Reserve greater powers to examine a holding
company’s subsidiaries
The ability of a holding company regulator to examine the
subsidiaries of a financial conglomerate remains a pressing concern
because the Dodd-Frank Act did not simplify the regulatory structure
within the United States. The U.S. regulatory structure continues to
rely heavily on functional and institutional regulation as illustrated in
Figure 6.

RULE ON ADVANCED CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK—BASEL II; ESTABLISHMENT OF A RISKBASED CAPITAL FLOOR (2010). The notice and comment period has expired. See id.
(noting that comments were due sixty days after its publication on December 16,
2010).
340. Id.
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Figure 6: How the Dodd-Frank Act Changed the Regulation of Financial
341
Conglomerates
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341. Dodd-Frank Act § 111(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1393 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5321); id. § 1011, at 1964–65 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).

BROWN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS

5/17/2011 6:48 PM

1407

The number of regulators operating with the United States
remains largely unchanged in the wake of the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act. While the OTS will be gone by 2012 at the latest,
342
the Act created a new federal regulator in the form of the CFPB.
The CFPB has the authority to regulate any consumer financial
product or service, except for products and services that fall within
the business of insurance or are considered electronic conduit
services, which the Act broadly defines to cover any type of electronic
data transmission, telecommunication system, or electronic
343
network.
As a result, all of the subsidiaries of the financial
conglomerate depicted in Figure 6, with the possible exception of the
insurance company, may be required to comply with regulations
344
issued by the CFPB.
The Dodd-Frank Act did improve the ability of the Federal Reserve
to examine at least some of the subsidiaries of the holding companies
under its supervision by requiring it to investigate nonbank
subsidiaries that are engaged in activities that the subsidiary bank can
345
perform. An example of this would be a mortgage broker that is a
subsidiary of a BHC. It is engaged in mortgage lending but does not
take deposits. Thus, the mortgage broker qualifies as a nonbank
subsidiary. It is, however, competing with banks that also issue
mortgages. Thus, the Federal Reserve would be required to examine
the mortgage brokerage subsidiary of the BHC under the DoddFrank Act.
3. The FSOC provides an inter-agency forum for making additional
improvements to supervision
The Dodd-Frank Act envisions that the FSOC will not only provide
a forum for inter-agency information sharing and coordination of
regulatory activities, but that it would fulfill several new supervisory
346
These duties include, among
and regulatory functions as well.
others, directing the work of the Office of Financial Research,
monitoring the financial system to identify threats to its stability,
advising Congress on domestic and international financial services

342. See id. § 1011, at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491) (establishing the
CFPB).
343. Id. §§ 1002, 1011, at 1956, 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481 and
12 U.S.C. § 5491, respectively).
344. See id. § 1011, at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491) (explaining that
the CFPB will regulate consumer financial products and services under the federal
consumer financial laws).
345. Id. § 605(b), at 1604 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831c).
346. Id. § 112(a)(2), at 1395–96 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5322).

BROWN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1408

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/17/2011 6:48 PM

[Vol. 60:1339

regulatory proposals, making recommendations to its member
agencies regarding supervisory priorities, reviewing and commenting
to the SEC on accounting principles and practices, and making
recommendations to the Federal Reserve regarding prudential
347
standards and risk management.
The FSOC can also compel its
member agencies, the Office of Financial Research and the FIO, to
provide it with any information or data that it deems necessary to
348
fulfill its duties under the Act. It can also compel certain financial
firms to provide it with information that it deems necessary to
349
safeguard the stability of the financial system.
4.

Weaknesses of the reforms to improve supervision
a. The FSOC’s powers to examine other types of nonbank subsidiaries
continue to be limited

The Dodd-Frank Act does not require the Federal Reserve to
examine nonbank subsidiaries that are not engaged in activities that a
350
subsidiary bank can perform.
The Federal Reserve still retains its
limited power to do so as the Dodd-Frank Act did not eliminate the
authority granted to the Federal Reserve to examine a subsidiary if it
determined that the subsidiary posed a material risk to an affiliated
depository institution, if it determined such an examination is
necessary to obtain information on any financial and operational
risks that pose a material risk to any depository subsidiary, or if it has
reasonable cause to believe that a subsidiary is not in compliance with
351
any law that it has the jurisdiction to enforce.
In addition, the
Dodd-Frank Act makes clear that, in the case of functionally
regulated subsidiaries, the Federal Reserve should not ask for new
reports, but it should rely on the reports already prepared by the
subsidiary for its functional regulator “to the fullest extent
352
possible.” As a result, it is still unlikely that under the Dodd-Frank
Act examination procedures the Federal Reserve will uncover the
risks posed by any holding company nonbank subsidiary like those of
AIG Financial Products Corporation, which was a nonbank subsidiary
that was not engaged in banking activities.
347. Id.
348. Id. § 112(a)(2)(A), (D), at 1395, 1396–97 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5322).
349. Id.
350. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
351. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(B) (2006).
352. Dodd-Frank Act § 604, 124 Stat. 1600 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1844(c)(1)).
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b. The FSOC generally cannot compel the Federal Reserve or the FSOC
members to adopt any of the new regulations that it recommends
With the exception of requiring the Federal Reserve to supervise
particular nonbank financial companies, directing the work of the
Office of Financial Research, and compelling certain institutions to
provide it with information, the FSOC has no authority to compel
either its member agencies or any financial firm to take any particular
regulatory action. As a result, its direct regulatory powers are rather
weak.
C. Attempts to Address the “Too Big To Fail” Problem
The Dodd-Frank Act makes a few attempts to provide mechanisms
for regulators to use to deal with the “too big to fail” problem.
353
Unfortunately, these actions are inadequate to the task.
1.

Limits placed on growth of financial conglomerates
The Act attempts to strengthen the restrictions on financial
conglomerates from becoming too big to fail by imposing some limits
on their growth. It does this in two ways. One way is by eliminating
the loophole in the Riegle-Neal Act that permitted mergers between
banks and thrifts or industrial loan companies that would create an
entity that controlled more than 10% of the deposits in the United
354
States. It does this by prohibiting interstate mergers that create any
depository institution, not just a bank, that controls more than 10%
355
of the deposits in the United States.
Another way that the Act places restrictions on financial
companies’ growth is by not permitting “financial companies,” which
include more than just depository institutions, from merging if the
resulting company would control more than 10% of the total
consolidated liabilities of all financial companies at the end of the
356
prior year.

353. For a more detailed analysis of this particular issue, see Arthur E. Wilmarth
Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem,
89 OREGON L. R. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719126.
354. Dodd-Frank Act § 623(a), 124 Stat. 1634 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
1828(c)).
355. Id.
356. Id. § 622, at 1632 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852).
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2. Allows the FSOC to make recommendations to address problems caused by
the size and complexity of financial conglomerates
The Dodd-Frank Act allows the FSOC to make recommendations
to the Federal Reserve regarding what standards to use to address the
357
problems posed by the growth in size and complexity of firms. This
potentially provides another force on the Federal Reserve,
encouraging it to adopt stronger prudential regulations to balance
the pressure from the financial services industry for weaker
regulations.
3. Attempts to establish an orderly liquidation process for financial
conglomerates
The Dodd-Frank Act creates what it calls an “orderly liquidation
authority” to force a troubled firm into liquidation to avoid a
358
Under this authority, the Treasury, the FDIC, and the
bailout.
Federal Reserve have the power to force a firm into liquidation, but
359
only if they unanimously agree to do so.
In addition, it requires
that at least two-thirds of the directors on the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve and at least two-thirds of the directors on the
360
Board of Directors for the FDIC have to approve the liquidation.
4.

Bans the use of taxpayer funds to bail out troubled financial firms
Finally, as part of this orderly liquidation authority, the Dodd-Frank
Act attempts to create a mechanism to liquidate financial firms while
having the costs of liquidation borne by the liquidating firm, its
shareholders and creditors, and paid for by an assessment on large
361
financial companies like an insurance guarantee fund.
The Act
goes so far as to expressly ban taxpayer funds from being used to
362
bailout or prevent the liquidation of any firm.

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Id. § 112(a)(2)(I), at 1395 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322).
Id. §§ 201–17, at 1377–524 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–401).
Id. § 206, at 1459 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5386).
Id. § 203(a)(1)(A), at 1450 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383).
Id. § 214, at 1518 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394).
Id. § 214(c), at 1518 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394).
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5. Weaknesses of the reforms aimed at addressing the “too big to fail”
problem
a. Loopholes continue to exist that will allow firms to evade the caps on
their growth
Unfortunately, the Dodd-Frank Act leaves open two loopholes,
which could result in other financial conglomerates controlling more
than 10% of the total deposits in the United States. The Act expressly
allows mergers that would create an entity that controls more than
10% of the total deposits in the United States when the merger
363
involves at least one financially distressed firm.
The merger
between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch was just such a merger
and resulted in a firm that now controls more than 11% of the
364
deposits in the United States.
In addition, the Act’s limits only
365
Thus, the Act would allow intrastate
apply to interstate mergers.
mergers that would create a firm with more than 10% of the deposits
in the United States.
With regard to the prohibition on a merger that would result in a
firm possessing 10% of the total consolidated liabilities of all financial
companies at the end of the prior year, the Dodd-Frank Act provides
three ways that this limit can be circumvented. The first way is if the
merger involves at least one firm that is in default or on the verge of
366
default.
The second way is if it is part of one of FDIC’s assistance
367
The third way is if the amount of the increase in total
programs.
368
liabilities above the limit is a “de minimis” amount above the limit.
The Act, however, does not define what would be a “de minimis”
369
amount.
These exceptions would allow two already too big to fail
firms, like Bank of America and Merrill Lynch or JP Morgan Chase
and Bear Stearns, to merge and control more than 10% of the total
liabilities of all financial companies. In other words, the exceptions
undermine the very purpose of the new rule.

363. Id. § 622(b), (c)(1), at 1633 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852).
364. Federal Reserve System, Bank of America Corporation, Charlotte, NC, Order
Approving the Acquisition of a Savings Association and an Industrial Loan Company
2 (Nov. 26, 2008). Bank of America controlled 10.8% of the deposits in the United
States and Merrill Lynch controlled 1.1% of the deposits in the United States at the
time that the Federal Reserve approved their merger. Id. The combined firm
controlled 11.9% of the deposits in the United States. Id.
365. Dodd-Frank Act § 622(b), 124 Stat. 1633 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852).
366. Id. § 622(c)(1), at 1633 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852).
367. Id. § 622(c)(2), at 1633 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852).
368. Id. § 622(c)(3), at 1633 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852).
369. Id.
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b. The FSOC has no authority to force the Federal Reserve to actually
adopt new regulations or standards
As discussed above, FSOC can only make recommendations to the
Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve is not required to implement
370
these recommendations.
Given how much the Federal Reserve
craves its independence, it is unclear whether it would be receptive to
the recommendations by the FSOC.
c. The agreement among the relevant agencies that a firm needs to be
liquidated may be difficult to achieve
The decision to force a firm into liquidation must be a unanimous
371
decision by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC.
Just
getting all three agencies to agree probably will be difficult,
particularly if the personalities heading those agencies do not get
372
along.
The Dodd-Frank Act makes reaching such an agreement
even more difficult by requiring that two-thirds of the Board of
Directors of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC must approve the
373
liquidation.
The United Kingdom’s experience during the Northern Rock crisis
illustrates this point.
A memorandum of understanding had
established a Tripartite Arrangement under which the Bank of
England, the Treasury, and the Financial Services Authority could
intervene to provide emergency assistance to a financial institution,
374
but only if all three agreed that such intervention was necessary. In
the case of Northern Rock, the Bank of England was reluctant to
provide assistance because of concerns about creating a moral hazard
375
problem.
The delays caused by the Bank of England’s

370. See supra Part III.B.4.b.
371. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
372. During the financial crisis, it was well known that Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner and FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair did not get along well with each other and
as a result, found it difficult to work together on issues that required their
cooperation.
373. Dodd-Frank Act § 203(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1450 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5383).
374. HM TREASURY ET AL., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN HM
TREASURY, THE BANK OF ENGLAND AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY 1, available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/mou.pdf.
375. Ian McConnell, About-turn from Bank Causes Stock Market Rocketing, HERALD
SCOTLAND, Sept. 20, 2007, http://www.heraldscotland.com/about-turn-from-bank-ofengland-sends-stock-market-rocketing-1.865568.
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unwillingness to authorize an intervention led to the first run on a
376
British bank in over 100 years.
d. Troubled financial firms can still receive other forms of government
assistance, even if they cannot directly receive taxpayer funds
Unfortunately, the prohibition on using taxpayer funds is not air
tight. The reality is that the Act allows the FDIC to provide assistance
to the liquidating firm’s receiver in order to facilitate an orderly
377
liquidation.
The FDIC can do this by providing loans, purchasing
or guaranteeing against loss of the firm’s assets, assuming or
guaranteeing obligations of the firm, taking a lien on the firm’s
378
assets, or providing the funding for a bridge financial company.
In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act only expressly prohibits the use of
taxpayer funds, but it does not prohibit the use of other funds to bail
379
out troubled firms. For example, troubled firms could continue to
use the Federal Reserve’s discount window and other programs prior
to entering receivership.
CONCLUSIONS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
We are better off than we were before, but the Dodd-Frank Act still
falls short in a number of areas. It is doubtful that Congress will have
the political will to revisit any of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
in the near future. Hopefully, Congress will not wait for another
major financial crisis before doing so.
The areas where
improvements could be made the next time these issues are
addressed include, among others, completely eliminating the
possibility of regulatory arbitrage for financial conglomerates, closing
or narrowing the loopholes that allow financial conglomerates to
grow beyond the caps set forth in the statutes, and simplifying the
regulatory structure to move it towards a twin peaks model.
With regard to the first issue, the Dodd-Frank Act sets up a rather
elaborate scheme to preserve some of the authority of existing state
agencies to regulate financial conglomerates, while moving towards
having the Federal Reserve supervise all of the largest, most
systemically important financial conglomerates. This arrangement is

376. Rosa M. Lastra, Northern Rock and Banking Law Reform in the UK, in THE
FAILURE OF NORTHERN ROCK: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE STUDY 133–34 (Tim
Congdon et. al. eds., 2009), available at
http://www.suerf.org/download/studies/study20091.pdf.
377. Dodd-Frank Act § 204(d), 124 Stat. 1455 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
378. Id.
379. Wilmarth, supra note 353, at 50–54.
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complex and cumbersome, and these characteristics may undermine
its effectiveness. If two-thirds of the voting members of the FSOC
cannot agree that a nonbank financial company should be supervised
by the Federal Reserve, then it will escape such supervision. Thus,
nonbank financial companies that want to escape such regulation
would only have to convince four members on the FSOC to block any
move to make them subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve.
Since agency capture is a documented problem, the ability of
industry groups to prevent the Federal Reserve from regulation of
systemically important holding companies is very real. An easier
method of eliminating the problems of regulatory arbitrage would
have been to make the Federal Reserve responsible for supervising all
holding companies for financial services firms, regardless of whether
they are BHCs, FHCs, or nonbank holding companies.
In terms of making additional progress on the too big to fail
problem, the easiest fix would be to close or narrow the loopholes
that allow firms to grow beyond the caps set forth in the statutes.
Certainly, the intrastate loophole should be eliminated. In addition,
Congress may also want to reconsider whether firms that have already
exceeded these caps should be broken up or at least forced to spin
off sufficient assets to bring them under the caps.
Finally, the U.S. regulatory system needs to be simplified and
moved away from a functional regulatory structure towards one that
regulates based on the risks posed by the products, services, or firms.
The complexity and costs of the current structure encouraged firms
to seek ways to avoid it. These incentives have only been heightened
with the new, more complex structure created by the Dodd-Frank
Act.
In addition, the structure’s very complexity was part of the reason
that firms were able to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the first
place. The structure is based on rigid definitions for banking,
securities, and insurance products that allowed them to create hybrid
products, services, or firms that failed to fit within those definitions.
By minding the gaps in the U.S. regulatory structure, financial firms
were able to take on excessive risks and create and sell questionable
products and services.
Other countries, like Australia, that have moved to a twin peaks
model avoid most of the problems that the United States experienced
in the recent financial crisis. For example, unlike the United States,
Australia did not have to bail out a single one of its financial
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institutions nor did it have dozens of financial firms fail. In a twin
peaks model, there is one national regulator for prudential risks and
one national regulator for market conduct and consumer protection
381
risks. The Dodd-Frank Act moved the United States slightly in that
direction by creating the CFPB and by giving the Federal Reserve
most of the authority to prudentially regulate systemically important
financial conglomerates. President Obama and his team did not feel
that the political will existed to move to a twin peaks model, despite
the fact that the Treasury Secretary for his Republican predecessor
had proposed doing just that in his blueprint for financial regulatory
reform. At some point in the future, the United States is going to
have to address this issue because the fragmentary nature of our
regulatory structure was the underlying cause for the problems with
the way the United States supervised financial conglomerates. The
fragmentary structure allowed regulatory arbitrage, created the need
for and the absence of regulatory coordination among agencies,
encouraged the lack of uniform supervisory and regulatory standards,
contributed to the lack of understanding by holding company
regulators of the risks posed by the subsidiaries within those
companies, and ultimately fostered our inability to adequately
address the too big to fail problem. Reforming the U.S. regulatory
structure is the one of the most important projects left undone by the
Dodd-Frank Act.
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